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ABSTRACT
The theory of global games has shown that converting games with complete infor-
mation to related games with incomplete information results in a unique equilibrium
prediction that typically coincides with risk-dominance. This dissertation experi-
mentally investigates this prediction in three different games: stag hunt, bargaining,
and entry games. There are two treatments in each of these games, complete and
incomplete information. In the stag hunt games, subjects under incomplete infor-
mation conditions deviate significantly from the equilibrium prediction in favor of
payoff dominance. They play similar strategies to those under complete information
conditions. In the bargaining games most subjects conform to the risk-dominant
prediction of global games theory, and convergence is stronger in games with incom-
plete information. In the entry games, in contrast to previous studies, subjects do
not over-enter the market. This is because when too many people enter the market,
firms’ entry decisions become strategic substitutes, and subjects earn more by staying
out of the market. There is less entry than the global games prediction. From these
three games, I can conclude that subjects follow the comparative static predictions of
global games theory, if not the precise predictions. Global games theory predictions
are more powerful if there is no payoff dominance as an alternative prediction.
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1. INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL GAMES AS AN EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
TOOL
Multiple strict equilibria arise in many economic situations: for example, team
production, public good provision, currency attacks, bank runs, market entry, and
technology adoption, see Cooper (1999). The refinements literature attempts to
solve this indeterminacy by imposing additional rationality restrictions or by requir-
ing additional robustness properties to refine the Nash equilibrium concept. How-
ever, because the equilibria are strict they survive all of the usual refinements, see
Van Damme (1991).
In an innovative paper, Carlsson and van Damme (1993b) demonstrate that con-
verting a complete information game with multiple strict equilibria into an incom-
plete information game, called a global game, results, in many cases, in a unique
dominance solvable equilibrium prediction. The conversion is motivated by the ob-
servation that even in complete information games, where the game form is common
knowledge, players are uncertain about others’ utility from the game. Usually, the
theory of global games assumes a special case of this general problem in which the
incomplete information game arises from players each observing a noisy signal of a
common state variable.
Morris and Shin (2001) motivate the importance of global games analysis by
observing that it is a “...heuristic device that allows the economist to identify the
actual outcomes in such games, and thereby open up the possibility of systematic
analysis of economic questions which may otherwise appear to be intractable.” Mul-
tiple equilibra are the consequence of two modeling assumptions: First, the economic
fundamentals are assumed to be common knowledge; second, players are assumed to
1
Table 1.1: A Class of Stag Hunt Games
A B
A 1, 1 0, q
B q, 0 q, q
be certain about others’ behavior in equilibrium, see also Morris and Shin (2000).
They write, “...global games allow modelers to pin down which set of self-fulfilling
beliefs will prevail in equilibrium.”
(Carlsson and van Damme, 1993b, p.1012) do not rely only on common knowledge
of rationality to justify the global games’ predictions. They argue that for a great
variety of learning processes the sequence of choices will eventually converge to the
set of strategies that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies,
see Milgrom and Roberts (1991). This suggests that the global games approach may
also be interpreted as the stochastic steady state of a realistic learning process.
In this dissertation, I test the predictions of the global games theory in laboratory
experiments in three different games: stag hunt, bargaining and entry games. In all of
these three games, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in games with incomplete
information, in which players only observe some payoffs with noise; however, there
are multiple Nash equilibria in games with complete information. I summarize these
three games in this chapter. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 discuss in more detail about stag
hunt, bargaining and entry games, respectively. Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation.
1.1 Global Stag Hunt Games
The class of stag hunt game forms, depicted in table 1.1, models a situation in
which symmetric players have two choices: a risky choice (A) and a safe choice (B).
Choice B guarantees a payoff of q while choice A yields a high payoff of 1 if the other
player also chooses A, but yields a low payoff of 0 if the other player chooses B. If
2
Table 1.2: A Class of Global Stag Hunt Games Observed by Player i
A B
A 1, 1 0, q + i
B q + i, 0 q + i, q + i
q ∈ [0, 1], the game has two strict equilibria: either both players choose A or both
players choose B. The equilibria are Pareto ranked, and (A,A), a payoff-dominant
equilibrium, dominates (B,B), a secure equilibrium. While this favors A, strategic
uncertainty, which is inherent in the strategy coordination problem, may lead players
to choose B instead. Intuitively, if q is high, then it is more likely that players will
choose B.
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) develop risk dominance as the selection principle when
payoff dominance fails to make a unique prediction. For a 2×2 game, risk dominance
is equivalent to choosing the equilibrium with the larger basin of attraction under
best response dynamics. It is straightforward to show that the (A,A) equilibrium
has the larger basin of attraction when q < 0.5 in which case both payoff dominance
and risk dominance agree on the selection of all A. However, when q > 0.5 the (B,B)
equilibrium has the larger basin of attraction in which case payoff dominance and
risk dominance conflict.
Carlsson and van Damme (1993b) develop an equilibrium selection theory based
on the idea that the payoff parameters of a game cannot be observed with certainty.
The complete information stag hunt game in table 1.1 is replaced by a payoff per-
turbed game: a global stag hunt game. In this game, each player observes the payoff
table in table 1.2 but his/her payoff is determined by the actual table in table 1.1.
Following (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993a, Section 4), we assume that every-
thing about the stag hunt game is common knowledge except the payoff to the safe
3
choice q. Each player receives a signal qi = q+ i that provides an unbiased estimate
of q. The signals are noisy so q is not common knowledge amongst the players. Let
q denote a random variable that is distributed on the interval [a.b] where a < 0 and
b > 1. So it is possible that q > 1 in which case B strictly dominates A and it
is possible that q < 0 in which case A strictly dominates B. Let (1, 2) denote a
two-tuple of zero mean independently and identically distributed random variables.
The i are assumed to be independent of q and to be distributed within [−E,E]
where E < −a
2
and E < b−1
2
. The incomplete information model is described by the
following rules:
1. (q, 1, 2) are randomly generated to obtain (q, q1, q2).
2. Player i observes qi and chooses between A and B.
3. Each player i receives payoffs which determined by choices made in step 2 and
the actual value of q in the table 1.1 with the mean matching protocol.
Because each player observes a different estimated value of q, the only strategy
that can be a best response is a threshold strategy. Carlsson and van Damme (1993b)
show that there exists only one threshold, 1 q∗, that survives iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies in the Global Stag Hunt Game.In this game, a unique
threshold, q∗ = 0.5. Remarkably this is true for any ε > 0 that are arbitrary small
(smaller than −a
2
and b−1
2
). Carlsson and van Damme’s argument thus gives another
reason to expect the risk-dominant equilibrium if the players have arbitrarily small
uncertainty about q. In the Global Stag Hunt Game, using a threshold of 0.5 is the
unique dominance solvable equilibrium.
4
Table 1.3: A Class of Bargaining Games
A B
A W,X 100, 100
B 100, 100 Y, Z
1.2 Global Bargaining Games
In a bargaining game shown in table 1.3, there are two strict equilibria in pure
strategies: (A,A) and (B,B). Many equilibrium selection principles have been pro-
posed to select an equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria. One of the prin-
ciples that has been widely used is payoff dominance. It compares the efficiency of
equilibria and selects the equilibrium that all players earn the most. In this game,
because the row player earns more with (A,A) while the column player earns more
with (B,B); there is no payoff-dominant equilibrium.
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) develop risk dominance as the selection theory when
payoff dominance fails to make a unique prediction. In 2× 2 games, risk dominance
is equivalent to choosing the equilibrium with the larger basin of attraction under
best-response dynamics. In other words, it selects the equilibrium with the larger
product of the deviation losses. In this game, risk dominance selects (A,A) when
(W−100)×(X−100) > (Y−100)×(Z−100) and (B,B) when (W−100)×(X−100) <
(Y − 100)× (Z − 100).
There are at least two other equilibrium selection principles that have been widely
used in bargaining: Rawlsian and Utilitarian. Rawlsian (Rawls (1971)) selects the
equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of the worst off player; it selects (B,B) in this
game because Y and Z are both greater than X. Utilitarian selects the equilibrium
with the largest payoff sum; it selects (A,A) when W +X > Y +Z and (B,B) when
1A threshold q∗ refers to a strategy in which a player chooses A if qj < q∗ and B if qj > q∗
5
Table 1.4: A Class of Global Bargaining Games (a, left) Actual Payoff Table; (b,
right) Subject i’s Estimated Payoff Table.
A B
A W,X 100, 100
B 100, 100 Y, Z
A B
A Wi, Xi 100, 100
B 100, 100 Yi, Zi
W +X < Y + Z.
Carlsson and van Damme (1993b) develop an equilibrium selection theory (a
global game) based on the idea that the payoff parameters of a game cannot be
observed with certainty. The complete information bargaining game in table 1.3 is
replaced by a payoff perturbed game: a global bargaining game, as in table 1.4. The
global game can be described by the following steps:
1. Nature selects W,X, Y, Z.
2. Each player independently observes W,X, Y, Z with some noise, so we denote
them as Wi, Xi, Yi, Zi for subject i.
3. Each player chooses between A and B simultaneously.
4. Each player receives payoffs as determined by the game form in step 1 and all
players’ choices in step 3.
In other words, player i observes a game on table 1.4b but the payoffs are de-
termined by a game on table 1.4a. Carlsson and van Damme (1993b) show that for
any 2×2 game, under some restrictions, iterated elimination of dominated strategies
in the global game forces each player to select an equilibrium equivalent to the risk
dominance criteria. The restrictions are (1) the initial subclass of games is large
enough and contains games with different equilibrium structures and (2) the noise is
6
Table 1.5: A Class of Entry Games where Q ∈ [0, 400]
No. of choice A 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
A Q Q+ 50 Q+ 100 Q+ 200 Q+ 100 Q+ 50 Q
B 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
independently distributed and is sufficiently small.2
Under incomplete information (i.e., global bargaining games), there exists a
unique equilibrium that is the same as the equilibrium derived from the risk domi-
nance criterion. Other equilibrium selection principles including Rawlsian and Util-
itarian are no longer equilibria because observing different parameters can lead to
different choices.
1.3 Global Entry Games with Strategic Substitutes and Complements
The class of entry game with strategic substitutes and complements, depicted in
Table 1.5, models a situation in which symmetric players have two choices: A, enter
the market, and B, do not enter the market. Choosing B and staying out of the
market guarantees a payoff of 300 regardless of other players’ choices. If a person
chooses A and enters the market, the payoff depends on Q and the number of other
players who choose to enter the market. The payoff is highest when 3 other players
also choose A; the payoff is lower as the number of other players who choose A is
further away from 3.
Under complete information, there is a unique dominance solvable equilibrium
when Q is less than 100 where all players play B; and when Q is more than 300 where
all players play A. Multiple equilibria exist when Q ∈ (100, 300). Two symmetric
equilibria are the following: (1) All players choose B; (2) Each player plays a mixed
strategy in which all players have the same probability of choosing A for the same
2See Carlsson and van Damme (1993b) for details of the proof.
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Table 1.6: A Class of Global Entry Games where Q ∈ [0, 400], Qi = Q + Ei where
Ei ∈ {−120,−119, ..., 0, ..., 120}
No. of choice A 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
A Qi Qi + 50 Qi + 100 Qi + 200 Qi + 100 Qi + 50 Qi
B 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
value of Q. There are also many asymmetric equilibria.
In the game with incomplete information, the fundamental state variable (Q)
cannot be observed with certainty. Each player observes the incomplete information
in Table 1.6 but the actual payoffs are determined by the game in Table 1.5. In
contrast to the game with complete information conditions, there exists a unique
threshold equilibrium in which players choose A and enter the market as long as
Qi ≥ 182 and choose B and stay out of the market when Q < 182 in game with
incomplete information conditions.
1.4 Global Games Experiments
There are different predictions between complete and incomplete information,
i.e., multiple equilibria in games with complete information and a unique equilib-
rium in games with incomplete information. Therefore, I experimentally test the
predictions under both complete and incomplete information in all three games.
The experimental results are used to: (1) compare the results of the game with com-
plete information to those with incomplete information; and (2) test if the subjects
conform to the global games predictions.
The results from the global stag hunt games show that subjects under complete
information play similar strategies to those under incomplete information. Under
complete information, subjects coordinate on the payoff maximizing equilibrium,
as expected. Under incomplete information, subjects exhibit substantial deviations
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from the equilibrium prediction of global games, coordinating just as well as subjects
in the complete information treatment.
In contrast to the results from the global stag hunt games, the majority of subjects
in the global bargaining games conform to the global games theory. When using a
finite mixture model, two-third of the subjects under incomplete information and
about half of the subjects under complete information can be classified as the risk
dominance (or global games) type. The results support the global games theory as
risk dominance is more salient under incomplete information. It also suggests that
players may use different strategies in games with different information conditions.
The implied “social preferences” of people are different under different information
conditions. Incomplete information can change people with different strategies to
use similar strategies in bargaining games.
The results from the global entry games with strategic substitutes and comple-
ments are in contrast to previous literature about global entry games with strategic
complements only: subjects in my experiments do not enter the market more often
than theoretical predictions as subjects in previous studies do. In fact, they enter
the market less often, i.e., use thresholds lower than the theoretical prediction. The
results indicate that subjects do not over-select risky options in the absence of payoff
dominance.
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2. WHEN LESS INFORMATION IS GOOD ENOUGH: EXPERIMENTS WITH
GLOBAL STAG HUNY GAMES
2.1 Introduction
Previous experimental work has shown that when playing a sequence of stag
hunt games, each having multiple equilibria, most subjects can coordinate on the
Pareto superior equilibrium, see Rankin, Van Huyck and Battalio (2000). This result,
however, was documented in an environment with complete information, i.e., where
subjects knew all individuals’ exact payoffs. Ideally, such coordination would persist
in environments with incomplete information as well since knowing payoffs with
precision may not always be possible. According to the theory of global games of
Carlsson and van Damme (1993b), adding even a very small amount of noise to
the payoffs–which transforms the game into one of incomplete information–yields a
unique equilibrium that is less efficient than what is found in lab experiments with
complete information.. Despite this unfavorable theoretical prediction, departures
from equilibrium behavior have been widely documented in the lab and the field.
As a result, it is unclear whether having incomplete information would significantly
reduce social welfare in practice.
In this chapter, I conduct an experiment where each subject plays a sequence of
perturbed stag hunt games in one of two treatments: one with complete and one
with incomplete information. Under complete information, subjects coordinate on
the payoff maximizing equilibrium, as expected. Under incomplete information, sub-
jects exhibit substantial deviations from the equilibrium prediction of global games,
coordinating just as well as subjects in the complete information treatment. Thus
the efficiency loss from observing imprecise information is not as drastic as theory
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Table 2.1: A Class of Stag Hunt Games
A B
A 1, 1 0, q
B q, 0 q, q
would suggest.
The class of stag hunt game forms depicted in Table 2.1 models a situation in
which symmetric players have two choices: a risky choice (A) and a safe choice (B).
Choice B guarantees a payoff of q while choice A yields a high payoff of 1 if the
other player also chooses A, but yields a low payoff of 0 if the other player chooses
B. If q ∈ [0, 1]., the game has two strict equilibria: either both players choose A or
both players choose B. The equilibria are Pareto ranked in which (A,A), a payoff-
dominant equilibrium, dominates (B,B), a secure equilibrium. While this favors A,
strategic uncertainty, which is inherent in the strategy coordination problem, may
lead players to choose B instead. Intuitively, if q is high, then it is more likely that
players will choose B. In fact, risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten (1988)) selects
(A,A) when q < 0.5 and (B,B) when q > 0.5.
Given the fact that it is more attractive to choose B when q is high, I expect
players to play “threshold” strategies where the players choose A if q ≤ q∗ and B if
q > q∗ for some q∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Any strategy profile where both players use threshold
strategies with the same q∗ will constitute an equilibrium because players will always
end up playing (A,A) when q ≤ q∗ and (B,B) when q > q∗.
Previous experimental research demonstrates the selection of the high-payoff equi-
librium is reached even when the structure of the game is changed in each period.
However, this game assumes that subjects know the payoff structure with extreme
precision, (i.e., complete information). This assumption may not be realistic as
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subjects may not be able to observe, or it may be too costly to observe precise infor-
mation. Therefore, I introduce noise to the value of q as in global games by Carlsson
and van Damme (1993b). In this global stag hunt game, each player independently
observes the value of q with noise in each period. Payoff dominance is no longer an
equilibrium because even when players use the same threshold, observing different
estimated values of q can lead them to select different choices. The theory of global
games has shown that the only equilibrium in this game is the risk-dominant thresh-
old (q∗ = 0.5) and iterated elimination of dominated strategies forces the players to
conform to this unique dominance solvable equilibrium.
The unique equilibrium prediction from global stag hunt games has lower ex-
pected payoffs than the payoff dominance observed in previous studies. However,
it has been shown in many settings that people may deviate from the equilibrium,
especially when playing the equilibrium yields low payoffs.1 Therefore, it is unclear
whether having less precise information would significantly reduce the social welfare
as the theory suggests.
Given the uncertainty about behavior, I compare a sequence of perturbed stag-
hunt games in two treatments: complete information and incomplete information.
Under complete information treatment, subjects observe the actual value of q with
certainty, while under incomplete information treatment, subjects observe the value
of q with noise that is uniformly distributed with zero mean.
Our results show that under complete information, most subjects use threshold
strategies that are close to the payoff-dominant equilibrium as expected.2 Under in-
complete information, subjects deviate significantly from the theory; only two out of
1Prisoners’ dilemma is a good example , see Rapoport and Chammah (1965) for many experi-
mental results.
2There is one remarkable cohort in which all eight subjects use the payoff-dominant threshold
in the last 50 periods.
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nine cohorts use the thresholds that are closer to the theoretical equilibrium thresh-
old than the payoff-dominant threshold. All other cohorts use thresholds that are
close to the payoff-dominant threshold: their behavior is similar to subjects in the
complete information treatment. The efficiency loss from observing imprecise infor-
mation is substantially smaller than the theoretical prediction.
To my knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the predictions of global
games theory in the stag hunt game. It is also first to compare the results of the
game with complete information to those with incomplete information. The closest
paper to mine, Rankin, Van Huyck and Battalio (2000), only examine the game
under complete information; my design in the complete information treatment is
intentionally similar to theirs.3 That paper reports an experiment in which subjects
play a sequence of 75 perturbed stag hunt games under complete information where
payoffs, action labels, and game forms are changed in each period. They show
that payoff dominance emerges as an equilibrium selection principle. In the last 15
periods, most subjects use threshold strategies that are close to 1, a payoff-dominant
threshold, and more than half of the subjects select a risky choice even when the
value of q is as large as 0.97.
In summary, this paper considers a sequence of perturbed stag-hunt games in
two treatments: complete information and incomplete information. Although under
incomplete information treatment, the theory predicts subjects will coordinate on
3Our design is different from Rankin, Van Huyck and Battalio (2000) in three important ways.
First, subjects are matched against everyone in the cohort each period and receive a payoff equal to
the mean of the matches. Stahl and Van Huyck (2002) call this protocol mean matching. Getting
feedback from everyone in the cohort aids the speed of adjustment and reduces the high variance
within cohort. Second, q is allowed to be smaller than 0 and larger than 1 as required by the
global games theory to get a unique equilibrium. In order to apply iterated dominance argument,
it requires the initial subclass of games to be large enough and contains games with different
equilibrium structures. Lastly, actions labels are fixed (a risky choice is always labeled A and a safe
choice is always labeled B) and subjects play the games for 100 periods. After each period, each
subject receives feedback on the the actual value of q, number of subjects in the cohort who chose
A and B, and his/her payoff.
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the risk-dominant threshold; subjects deviate significantly from that threshold to-
ward payoff-dominant threshold. We find no significant difference between subjects’
earnings in two treatments which suggests that the efficiency loss from not observing
precise information may not be as high as the theory predicts.
2.2 Analytical Framework
To study whether subjects can coordinate with imprecise information, I intention-
ally choose a stag hunt game because of the its different prediction under complete
and incomplete information. Under complete information, any strategy profile where
both players use the same threshold strategy will constitute an equilibrium. However,
under incomplete information, iterated elimination of dominated strategies forces the
players to conform to the unique threshold equilibrium which is not efficient. Given
this theoretical prediction, it is unfavorable for subjects in incomplete information
to coodinate.
To focus the analysis, consider complete information stag hunt game forms where
n identical players, indexed by i, simultaneously choose between A and B. Let k
denote the number of players, including i, that choose A. Each player i is matched
with the other n− 1 players and earns the average payoff, from these matches using
Table 2.1. This is the matching protocol used in the experiment, which is called a
mean matching protocol. Player i’s payoff to A is p(k, n) = k−1
n−1 ·1+
(
1− k−1
n−1
)
·0 = k−1
n−1
for k ≥ 14 and to B is q.
Suppose q ∈ (0, 1), consider the strategy assignment in which all n players choose
A. Since k = n, the payoff to A is 1. Deviating from the strategy assignment yields
q, which is less than 1 by assumption. Hence, playing A is a best response to the
4Since k cannot be less than 1 when player i chooses A, define p (k, n) ≡ 0 for k < 1. Notice
that p(x) is non-decreasing with p(0) = 0 and p(1) = 1 as required by (Carlsson and van Damme,
1993a, p.239).
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other n−1 players choosing A and by symmetry a strict Nash equilibrium. Consider
the strategy assignment in which all n players choose B. The payoff to B is always q.
Deviating from the strategy assignment yields 0, which is less than q by assumption.
Hence, playing B is a best response to the other n − 1 players choosing B and by
symmetry a strict Nash equilibrium.5
All of the players prefer all A, which yields them 1, over all B, which yields them
less than 1. The presence of multiple Pareto ranked equilibria confronts the player
with a strategy coordination problem. While this favors A, strategic uncertainty,
which is inherent in the strategy coordination problem, may lead players to choose
B instead. Intuitively, if q is high, then it is more likely that players will choose B.
2.2.1 Equilibrium Selection
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) struggle with the choice of selection theory and ulti-
mately give priority to payoff dominance, which compares the efficiency of equilibria
and, if it exists, selects the equilibrium that all players prefer. In the class of stag
hunt games under consideration this principle selects the all A equilibrium regard-
less of the value of q, which does not capture the intuitive notion discussed in the
introduction that the likelihood of all A should depend on q.6
Given the fact that it is more attractive to choose B when q is high, I expect a
rational player to play a “threshold” strategy where the player chooses A if q ≤ q∗
and B if q > q∗ for some q∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Any strategy profile where all players use
threshold strategies with the same q∗ will constitute an equilibrium because the
group will always end up playing all A when q ≤ q∗ and all B when q > q∗. The
payoff dominance has a threshold of 1 because it suggests subject to select A when
5There are no other strict Nash equilibria, see (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993a, Proposition
2.1).
6In the global stag games to be introduced below, A is not always the payoff-dominant equilib-
rium anymore since q can be larger than 1; in which case, B strictly dominates A.
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Table 2.2: A Class of Global Stag Hunt Games Observed by Player i
A B
A 1, 1 0, q + i
B q + i, 0 q + i, q + i
q ≤ 1.
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) develop risk dominance as the selection principle when
payoff dominance fails to make a unique prediction. For n = 2, risk dominance is
equivalent to choosing the equilibrium with the larger basin of attraction under best
response dynamics. It is straightforward to show that the (A,A) equilibrium has the
larger basin of attraction when q < 0.5 in which case both payoff dominance and
risk dominance agree on the selection of all A. However, when q > 0.5 the (B,B)
equilibrium has the larger basin of attraction in which case payoff dominance and
risk dominance conflict.
For n > 2, (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, p.207-209) use the tracing procedure to
select the risk-dominant equilibrium. It is straightforward to check the conditions
given in Proposition 3.1 of Carlsson and van Damme (1993a) to find the critical value
of q, denoted q∗, that determines if risk dominance and payoff dominance conflict:
q∗ = 0.5 as in the case where n = 2. Risk dominance selects all A when q < 0.5 and
all B when q > 0.5, a threshold of 0.5.
2.2.2 Global Stag Hunt Games
Carlsson and van Damme (1993b) develop an equilibrium selection theory based
on the idea that the payoff parameters of a game cannot be observed with certainty.
The complete information stag hunt game in Table 2.1 is replaced by a payoff per-
turbed game: a global stag hunt game. In this game, each player observes the payoff
table in Table 2.2 but his/her payoff is determined by the actual table in Table 2.1.
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Following (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993a, Section 4), I assume that everything
about the stag hunt game is common knowledge except the payoff to the safe choice
q. Each player receives a signal qi = q + i that provides an unbiased estimate of
q. The signals are noisy so q is not common knowledge amongst the players. Let q
denote a random variable that is distributed on the interval [a.b] where a < 0 and
b > 1. So it is possible that q > 1 in which case B strictly dominates A and it is
possible that q < 0 in which case A strictly dominates B. Let (1, 2, . . . , n) denote
an n-tuple of zero mean independently and identically distributed random variables.
The i are assumed to be independent of q and to be distributed within [−E,E]
where E < −a
2
and E < b−1
2
. The incomplete information model is described by the
following rules:
1. (q, 1, 2, . . . , n) are randomly generated to obtain (q, q1, q2, . . . , qn).
2. Player i observes qi and chooses between A and B.
3. Each player i receives payoffs which determined by choices made in step 2 and
the actual value of q in Table 2.1 with the mean matching protocol.
Because each player observes different estimated value of q, the only strategy that
can be a best response is a threshold strategy. We can show that there exists only
one threshold, q∗, that survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies
in the Global Stag Hunt Game. If all but player i use a threshold q∗, player i will
also use a threshold q∗ if his expected payoffs from choosing A and B are the same
when observing q∗. His expected payoff from choosing B is q∗. Player j would choose
A if qj < q
∗ and B if qj > q∗ , so player i’s expected payoff from choosing A when
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observing p∗ is given by7
n∑
k=1
p (k, n)× (n−1)!
(k−1)!(n−k)!
2(n−1)
,
which is the expected value from choosing A when the number of players choosing
A is from {1, 2, . . . , n} . If we let this equation equals q∗, we can see that q∗ = 0.5.8
Remarkably this is true for any ε > 0 that are arbitrary small (smaller than −a
2
and
b−1
2
). Carlsson and van Damme’s argument thus gives another reason to expect the
risk-dominant equilibrium if the players have arbitrarily small uncertainty about q.
In the Global Stag Hunt Game, using a threshold of 0.5 is the unique dominance
solvable equilibrium. Any thresholds p 6= 0.5 cannot be constituted as a mutual best
response or an equilibrium for every player in the group. This is because if all players
except player i use the same threshold of p, player i’s expected payoff from choosing
A when observing qi = p is 0.5 which is not equal to p, the expected payoff from
choosing B.
2.2.3 Global Stag Hunt Game Used in the Experiment
In this experiment, I transform the game in Table 2.1 to the game in Table 2.3:
G2 = 400×{G1 + 0.25}, where G2 is the game used in the experiment and G1 is the
game in Table 2.1. Our main reason is to avoid decimal points and negative earnings
in any periods. We use a group size n = 8.
Under complete information, the payoff dominance threshold is 500 and the risk
dominance threshold is 300. Under incomplete information, a unique threshold equi-
librium Q∗ satisfies
72(n−1) is a number of all possible cases from the fact that each player j has the same probability
to choose A or B. p(k, n) = k−1n−1 is the payoff when k players including player i choose A.
(n−1)!
(k−1)!(n−k)!
is a number of cases where k players including player i choose A.
8In general, this may not give the same critical value as risk dominance when n is greater than
two, but for the mean matching protocol p∗ = 0.5.
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Table 2.3: Version of Global Stag Hunt Game Form Used in the Experiment (a, left)
Actual Payoff Table; (b, right) Subject i’s Estimated Payoff Table.
A B
A 500,500 100, Q
B Q, 100 Q,Q
A B
A 500,500 100, Q+ Ei
B Q+ Ei, 100 Q+ Ei, Q+ Ei
Q∗ =
8∑
k=1
[100 + {400× ( k−1
n−1)}]× 7!(k−1)!(8−k)!
27
.
That is Q∗ = 300, the risk dominance threshold.
2.3 Experimental Design
The stage game form used in the experiment is given in Table 2.3: each player ob-
served the right table but his/her payoff was determined by the left table. The stage
game was played 100 times to give adequate experience for the iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies to convergence to equilibrium. The values of Q used in
the experiment were integers in the interval 0 to 600, that is, Q ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 600}.
The sequences of a hundred values of Q were generated by a computer using a uni-
form distribution. As stated in the instructions, “Many sequences of one hundred
Qs were generated. One of these sequences will be used in today’s session.” The
sequence was chosen to be representative of a uniform distribution even in small
samples. The units denote twentieths of a cent.
Two treatments were conducted. In the baseline treatment of complete informa-
tion about Q, Ei = 0, that is the observed and the actual table were identical. In
the incomplete information treatment, Q was only observed with error. The private
signal error was Ei ∈ {−50,−49, . . . , 49, 50}. The sequences were generated in the
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same way as the Q sequences. The same sequence of Q + Ei was used in all ses-
sions of a treatment, but different sequences were used for the complete information
treatment and the incomplete information treatment.
The instructions were read aloud to ensure the game was common information
among the participants. After the instructions the participants filled out a question-
naire to establish that the participants knew how to calculate their earnings. There
were always mistakes on at least one questionnaire and the section on calculating
earnings was always reread to the participants. Many more mistakes were made in
the incomplete information treatment than the complete information treatment. The
appendix contains the instructions, questionnaire, and screen shots of the graphical
user interface. After each period, each subject received feedback on the actual value
of q, number of subjects in the cohort who chose A and B, and his/her payoff.
Three sessions of three cohorts, or a total of nine cohorts, were conducted for
each treatment. Each cohort consisted of eight participants. Thus, each treatment
used 72 participants and the total number of participants was 144. The participants
were Texas A&M University undergraduates recruited campus wide using ORSEE,
see Greiner (2004).
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree, see
Fischbacher (2007). The experiment was conducted in the Economic Research Lab-
oratory at Texas A&M University, which has 36 networked participant stations, in
February and March of 2013. A five dollar show up fee plus their earnings in the
session were paid to the participants in private and in cash. The average earnings
were about $29.19 for a session that lasted between 70 and 90 minutes.
After the decision making portion of the session was completed and while they
waited for their earnings to be calculated, participants filled out a questionnaire that
asked them to explain their behavior in the session.
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2.4 Experimental Results
2.4.1 Basic Results
A useful way to look at the data is with histograms of the frequency of A among a
cohort by either the private signal, Q+Ei, or Q depending on whether the treatment
is complete information or incomplete information. Figures 1 to 18 report the his-
tograms by 25 period intervals for the incomplete information treatment and by 50
period intervals for the complete information treatment. The incomplete information
treatment fills more bins, because usually there are eight different observations per
period, than the complete information treatment, where all eight observations are
for the same Q. Also, there appeared to be more learning going on with incomplete
information than complete information.
Cohorts 1 to 9 were conducted under the incomplete information conditions.
Looking down the page, one can see how the histograms are changing with experience.
Cohorts 1 and 2 in figures 2.1 to 2.4 show evidence of learning to play the unique
equilibrium of the incomplete information game, 300; that is, fewer participants are
choosing A when the private signal is over 400 in each twenty-five period interval.
These two cohorts are the only ones to do this.
Cohort 3 in figures 2.1 to 2.4 is more typical of the results in the incomplete in-
formation treatment. In periods 76 to 100, the participants implemented an almost
perfect step function at 450, that is, when the private signal was less than 450 every-
one in every period choose A, the risky action associated with the payoff-dominant
equilibrium, and when the private signal was more than 450 almost everyone in every
period choose B.
Cohort 4 in figures 2.5 to 2.8 shows some unraveling towards the unique equilib-
rium but for signals in (400,450] more than fifty percent of the play is A. Cohorts 5
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and 6 in figures 2.5 to 2.8 and Cohorts 7 to 9 in figures 2.9 to 2.12 all converge on
a transition from all A to all B at around a private signal of about 450, well above
the unique global game equilibrium threshold of 300.
Cohorts 10 to 18 were conducted under the complete information treatment.
Cohort 10 in figures 2.13 and 2.14 is perhaps the most remarkable. Cohort 10 coor-
dinated perfectly on payoff dominance as the selection principle, that is, when Q was
in [0,500] all eight participants played A in every period from 51 to 100 and when
Q was in (500,600] all eight participants played B in every period from 51 to 100.
However, Cohort 10 is the only complete information cohort to do this.
Cohort 15’s histogram is almost a perfect step function but at Q equals 400. The
remaining complete information cohorts all appear to step down at a Q in [400, 500].
The threshold (step down) coordinated on is cohort specific.
2.4.2 Estimated Thresholds
The histograms in figures 2.1 to 2.18 appear to us to have the shape of a logistic
function. In order to get a more precise measure of the heterogeneity of the various
cohorts, I estimated the following logit model on the cohort data for periods 76 to
100:
p(Q+ E) =
eb0+b1(Q+E)
1 + eb0+b1(Q+E)
,
where p(Q+E) is the probability of A. Table 2.4 reports the estimated parameters
and the critical value for the eighteen cohorts. The reported estimate for cohort
12 excludes subject 17, who feel asleep twice, nodded off repeatedly, and appears
to have played randomly. In the questionnaire, he wrote that he played randomly,
which makes him a self-reported step-0 thinker and not a threshold user.
While it is notable that the two values close to the risk-dominant threshold of
300 occurred in the incomplete information treatment and the one value essentially
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Table 2.4: Estimated Logit Models and Critical Values by Cohort for Last 25 Periods.
Cohort Treatment b0 b1 Q+ E = p
−1(0.5) Rank
cohort 1 Incomplete 18.193 -0.056 326.9 1
cohort 2 Incomplete 13.617 -0.037 369.3 2
cohort 3 Incomplete 97.956 -0.216 454.8 11
cohort 4 Incomplete 14.551 -0.033 436.8 7
cohort 5 Incomplete 31.069 -0.068 460.3 15
cohort 6 Incomplete 29.868 -0.068 439.8 8
cohort 7 Incomplete 28.753 -0.062 460.1 14
cohort 8 Incomplete 24.569 -0.054 455.5 12
cohort 9 Incomplete 76.780 -0.167 458.9 13
cohort 10 Complete 1195.46 -2.421 494.0 18
cohort 11 Complete 41.826 -0.091 460.6 16
cohort 12 Complete 18.977 -0.047 407.2 4
cohort 13 Complete 32.420 -0.072 453.4 10
cohort 14 Complete 23.003 -0.051 452.8 9
cohort 15 Complete 286.596 -0.716 400.6 3
cohort 16 Complete 18.248 -0.043 422.4 5
cohort 17 Complete 68.294 -0.145 471.8 17
cohort 18 Complete 27.261 -0.063 435.9 6
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at the payoff-dominant threshold of 500 occurred in the complete information treat-
ment, I cannot reject the hypothesis that both treatments were drawn from the same
distribution. The Mann-Whitney test statistic is 83 for the incomplete information
treatment and 88 for the complete information treatment. For significance at the
10 percent level, the test statistic for the incomplete information treatment would
have to be less than 71.9 Most estimated thresholds are around 450 regardless of
treatment. A stochastic steady state appears to have emerged for most cohorts with
a threshold in the interval [400,500]. These thresholds are cohort specific and would
seem difficult to predict on an apriori basis.
Figures 2.19 and 2.20 illustrate the estimated logit models. The lines in the fig-
ures show the critical values at which fifty percent of the participants in a cohort
are choosing A and fifty percent are choosing B. The incomplete information co-
horts have two outliers and seven tightly clustered around 450, while the complete
information cohorts have almost a uniform distribution in the [400,500] interval.
2.4.3 Debriefing Questionnaire
After the 100 choices were made, the subjects were asked to complete a debriefing
questionnaire consisting of four questions. The first question was, “What strategy
did you use while playing this game? Please include details about what led you to
choose A or B.” The answers were revealing. Seventy-two percent of the subjects in
the incomplete information treatment and ninety-two percent of the subjects in the
complete information treatment reported using a threshold. For example, a subject
reported, “I chose B when the odds were that Q was greater than 500. I used the
estimate to decide this.” Twenty-five different exact thresholds are mentioned in
the 144 subject responses ranging from 300 to 500. One subject used a threshold
9See Conover (1980) Table A7. The two-sample t statistic for a difference in treatment means
is -0.8, which is also not statistically significant.
24
of 300, the risk-dominant threshold. The most common exact threshold was chose
A if Q is less than 500 and B otherwise. It was chosen by nineteen percent of the
subjects. Other popular choices were thresholds at 450, 400, and 440 to 445 in order
of decreasing popularity.10
The last group, 440 to 445, comes from subjects who best respond to the belief
that one opponent chooses B. A typical answer was, “I choose A or B depending
on the spread that I was given for choice B. I calculated the costs of one of my
’teammates’ deviating from A and choosing B. If one person deviated and I picked
A I would receive 442, if 2 picked B I would get 385 and so on. If the bottom
boundary of my spread for Q was greater than 442 I choose B. If it was not then I
chose A.”
Ten percent of the subjects reported what we call a fuzzy threshold. They would
chose A for sure if Q was less than w and B for sure if Q was more than z, where
w < z, and sometimes one or the other for Q in [w, z]. For example, a subject wrote,
“If B was over 500, I would choose B. If B was under 400 I automatically chose A.
If B was between 400 and 500, I debated whether or not to choose B, more times
than not deciding to do so.”11
The second debriefing question was, “Did you change your strategy over time?”
Fifty-four percent of the subjects in the incomplete information treatment and two-
thirds of the subjects in the complete information treatment reported changing their
strategy over time.
The third debriefing question question was, “If you changed your strategy, what
10If we treat a strict threshold player as someone who always chose A for Q below some value
and always chose B for Q above the same value, then inspecting the individual data reveals that
for the last 25 periods 76 percent of the subjects in the incomplete information treatment and 81
percent of the subjects in the complete information treatment were strict threshold players.
11Subjects using a fuzzy threshold seem to be engaged in fast and slow thinking popularized by
Kahneman (2011). Schotter and Trevino (2013) exploit the difference in measured response time
to accurately predict observed individual thresholds in a global game.
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made you change it?” The typical response was the behavior of the other players
in particular the need to coordinate on the same threshold. For example, a subject
wrote, “I was initially choosing the highest number of all those provided, so that was
typically A unless B was a higher number. However, through the experiment other
participants stopped choosing the highest number (A = 500) when B became more
than 400.” Our interpretation of this quote is that the participant started using
what might be called a wishful thinking strategy (Maximax) because they write that
the payoff to A was 500. Over time they learned that the group was coordinating
on a threshold of 400 and this led them to change their behavior. Reading the
debriefing answers from the cohort that perfectly coordinated on the payoff-dominant
threshold of 500, cohort 10, I am now convinced that subjects initially started with a
wishful thinking strategy rather than any equilibrium concept like payoff dominance.
It is only after observing dis-coordination that they begin thinking about how to
coordinate with the group.
The forth question asked participants, “If you could play this game again, what
would you do?” Fifty-one percent answered that they would do the same thing.
Thirty-one percent answered that they would change their strategy especially using
the strategy that they adopted at the end of the session earlier. Other frequently
mentioned answers include wishing that they could communicate and that they chose
A more often.
A comparison of the location of the logit estimate of the group threshold by 25
period bins reveals very little movement in the estimated threshold. For the nine
incomplete information cohorts, the average absolute value of the change from the
estimated threshold in the first 25 periods and the last 25 periods is 22 units. For the
nine complete information cohorts, the average absolute value of the change from the
estimated threshold in the first 25 periods and the last 25 periods is also 22 units.
26
Interestingly, eight out of the nine incomplete information cohorts decline between
the first and last 25 periods, that is, in the direction predicted by the theory, while
five of nine complete information cohorts increase, which is slightly more than one
would expect from chance.
2.4.4 Discussion
We find no significant difference between subjects in complete and incomplete
information treatments. The results are positive for efficiency’s standpoint; coor-
dination persists in environments with incomplete information. Despite the fact
that subjects under incomplete information treatment should conform to the risk-
dominant threshold, they deviate significantly toward an efficiency threshold.
It might seem puzzling that there is so little learning in the incomplete informa-
tion treatment when myopic best-response dynamic theory suggests that subjects
should be learning iterated dominance. If we always round down fractions to inte-
gers, it takes 20 best response iterations to go from the payoff-dominant assignment
of all use a threshold of 500 to the risk-dominant assignment of all use a threshold
of 300. Without rounding the process does not converge in a finite number of itera-
tions. But notice that learning iterated dominance requires subjects to move to less
efficient outcomes, which previous work suggests subjects are reluctation to do, see
Van Huyck, Cook and Battalio (1997).
A calculation of the monetary incentive to deviate from an assignment may ex-
plain why subjects are not learning iterated dominance. In the incomplete infor-
mation treatment, the best response, c∗, to an assignment of all play a threshold
p is given by the following equation: c∗ = 60 + 4
5
p. Consider an assignment to a
threshold strategy combination of all use 450. The best response is a threshold of
420. However, the optimization premium, the monetary incentive to give a best re-
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sponse, is an average of 3.75 units or 0.2 cents. This calculation is myopic because as
behavior converges on 300 the group is moving to less efficient outcomes. If everyone
conformed to a threshold of 450, they would each earn $24.90 for the session. All
participants using the risk-dominant threshold of 300, which is what best response
learning converges to, would earn an average of $23.35 for the session, which is a $1.55
dollar difference for the session and approximately a 1.6 cent difference per period.
The lost efficiency is about eight times larger than the monetary incentive to best
respond given an assignment to everyone to use 450 as their threshold. Previous work
has shown that subjects are reluctant to converge towards less efficient outcomes.
This reluctance combined with a low myopic incentive to best respond may explain
the similar behavior observed under complete and incomplete information.
The low optimization premium relative to the inefficiency of the unique equilib-
rium is a property of the equilibrium solution. Scaling up the payoffs will make both
larger by the same proportion. This can be seen in figure 2.21, which graphs the
Expected Utility of the payoff-dominant threshold, Eu(qi|500) in red, and the risk-
dominant threshold, Eu(qi|300) in blue, given a realization of qi. The horizontal axis
graphs qi and the vertical axis graphs Eu(qi|p). Notice that the Expected Utility
function is discontinuous at Eu(500|500). At the payoff-dominant threshold of all
play 500 the expected utility from playing A is not 500, because on average half the
participants observe a qj above 500 and play B, which earns 100 per match, and half
the participants observe a qj below 500 and play A, which earns 500 per match, mak-
ing the expected earnings 300. For observations qi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 448, 449} the player
can be sure that in a payoff-dominant assignment all of the other players receive a
signal that induces them to play A and they all earn 500. Similar considerations give
the risk-dominant, Eu(qi|300), function.
The dashed line and black dot in the function give the best response, 460, to
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an assignment of all play 500. The area of the shaded triangle gives the expected
earnings gained from deviating from the assignment to the best response. The differ-
ence between playing 460 and 500 is from observations qi ∈ {460, 461, . . . , 498, 499}
in which strategy 460 plays B while strategy 500 plays A. The average expected
earnings lost from playing 500 is 6.67 (from the triangle area, 4,000, divided by 600).
The area of the shaded polygon minuses the area of the shaded triangle gives the
expected earnings lost from moving from the payoff dominance to the risk dominance
(and global games solution). This loss is, on average, 33.33 or about five times larger
than the gains from playing 460 instead of 500 when all other players play 500. Scal-
ing the payoffs from 600 to 6,000 or 600,000 will not change the relative areas of the
two shapes.
2.5 Literature Review
There is a large literature on repeated stag hunt games, see Battalio, Samuelson
and Van Huyck (2001) for references. Rankin, Van Huyck and Battalio (2000) es-
timate thresholds from individual data from an experiment with similar stag hunt
games, that is, in terms of this paper for 100 < Q < 500. They find that most
subjects can coordinate on high thresholds which are close to the payoff-dominant
equilibrium. Stahl and Van Huyck (2002) using finite mixture models reject the
threshold specification in favor of learning conditional behavior from individual data
from an experiment with two ranges of experience: one with 100 < Q < 500 and
one with 300 < Q < 500. They find that experiencing with a greater range of Stag
Hunt games increases the likelihood of coordinating on high thresholds. Other dif-
ferences include using random matching in Rankin, Van Huyck and Battalio (2000)
and mean matching in Stahl and Van Huyck (2002) and this paper. The answers to
the debriefing questionnaire used in the experiment strongly support the view that
29
subjects are using threshold strategies over learning conditional behavior.
Most of the experimental literature which tests global games predictions focuses
on variations of the speculative attack model of Morris and Shin (1998). In this game,
an individual has two choices: ’attack’ and ’not attack’. A player who attacks has an
opportunity cost T . If a sufficient number of players choose to attack, they succeed
and each of the attacking agents earns an amount Y . They assume that the number of
players needed for a successful attack is a non-increasing function in Y . In this game,
if Y < T , the dominant strategy is ’not attack’. There exists Y¯ such that for Y > Y¯ ,
the dominant strategy is ’attack’. For Y such that T < Y < Y¯ , there are two pure
Nash Equilibria, all ’attack’ and all ’not attack’. The value of Y varied from period to
period. The first test of global games predictions in the speculative attack model was
Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2004). They could not find a threshold difference
between two treatments. However, they find equilibrium multiplicity under common
information treatment but uniqueness under private information treatment. The
unique equilibrium that they find under private information treatment is different
from my results which suggests equilibrium multiplicity. Cornand (2006) considers
two treatments in which subjects can observe two signals. In one treatment, subjects
observe both private and common signals whereas subjects in another treatment
observe two common signals. She finds that in the treatment with both private and
common information, subjects use the public signal as a focal point.
Crawford, Costa-Gomes and Iriberri (2010) criticizes the global games approach
on two grounds. First, there is no evidence that people initially perceive the un-
certainty in a game as if they were playing a global game, that is, an incomplete
information version of the game with special payoff perturbations. Instead, the in-
complete information in a global games analysis is constructed to allow the iterated
dominance argument. Second, the experimental evidence surveyed in their paper
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suggests that people stop far short of the many steps of iterated dominance that is
needed to make a global games analysis yield a precise prediction. These two rea-
sons could explain why subjects can coordinate under incomplete information in my
experiment.
2.6 Conclusion
It has been shown that a Pareto superior equilibrium can be attained when play-
ing a sequence of similar stag hunt games with complete information. However,
precise information may not always be available or it may be too costly to obtain.
This paper tests whether such coordination would presevere with less precise in-
formation. Therefore, I run an experiment where each subject plays a sequence of
perturbed stag hunt games with either complete or incomplete information. Under
complete information, there is one cohort in which all eight subjects select the choices
that are consistent with payoff dominance in the last 50 periods. All other cohorts
use thresholds that are closer to the payoff dominance than the risk dominance.
Under incomplete information, the theory of global games has shown that subjects
should conform to a unique dominance solvable equilibrium that is risk-dominant.
However, only one cohort uses a threshold closes to this prediction. All other cohorts
deviate significantly from the prediction and coordinate just as well as subjects in
the complete information treatment. Under incomplete information, iterated elimi-
nation of dominated strategies forces the players to conform to a unique dominance
solvable equilibrium. However, both estimated thresholds and self-report reveal little
tendency to converge to that equilibrium.
It might seem puzzling that subjects in the incomplete information treatment do
not converge to the theoretical prediction when myopic best-response dynamic theory
suggests that subjects should be learning iterated dominance. One explanation could
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be that the gains from playing best response are small compared to the efficiency loss
from moving to the equilibrium, so they would rather coordinate on high thresholds.12
Another explanation could be that subjects may treat the imprecise information as
if it were precise and play accordingly. We leave it as a future extension of my work
to experimentally investigate which explanation explains the results better.
For efficiency’s standpoint, my results are quite positive because they suggest
that coordination on socially desirable outcomes can be reached without having to
spend resources to obtain precise information. One open question is to consider if
people would pay to know the information with precision. Based on my results, the
benefit from doing so is small, which suggests that they should not be willing to pay
unless the cost is rather low.
12Previous work suggests subjects are reluctant to play best response when it requires them to
move to less efficient outcomes, see Van Huyck, Cook and Battalio (1997) for example.
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Figure 2.1: Cohorts 1 to 3 Periods 1 to 25
Figure 2.2: Cohorts 1 to 3 Periods 26 to 50
Figure 2.3: Cohorts 1 to 3 Periods 51 to 75
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Figure 2.4: Cohorts 1 to 3 Periods 76 to 100
Figure 2.5: Cohorts 4 to 6 Periods 1 to 25
Figure 2.6: Cohorts 4 to 6 Periods 26 to 50
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Figure 2.7: Cohorts 4 to 6 Periods 51 to 75
Figure 2.8: Cohorts 4 to 6 Periods 76 to 100
Figure 2.9: Cohorts 7 to 9 Periods 1 to 25
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Figure 2.10: Cohorts 7 to 9 Periods 26 to 50
Figure 2.11: Cohorts 7 to 9 Periods 51 to 75
Figure 2.12: Cohorts 7 to 9 Periods 76 to 100
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Figure 2.13: Cohorts 10 to 12 Periods 1 to 50
Figure 2.14: Cohorts 10 to 12 Periods 51 to 100
Figure 2.15: Cohorts 13 to 15 Periods 1 to 50
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Figure 2.16: Cohorts 13 to 15 Periods 51 to 100
Figure 2.17: Cohorts 16 to 18 Periods 1 to 50
Figure 2.18: Cohorts 16 to 18 Periods 51 to 100
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Figure 2.19: Estimated Probability of Choosing A given the Value of Q + Ei, Logit
Models: Incomplete Information Treatment
Figure 2.20: Estimated Probability of Choosing A given the value of Q, Logit Models:
Complete Information Treatment
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Figure 2.21: The Eu(qi|500) Function and the Eu(qi|300) Function.
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3. PRUDENCE, JUSTICE, AND BENEVOLENCE: EVIDENCE FROM
REPEATED GLOBAL BARGAINING GAMES
3.1 Introduction
Bargaining problems usually result in multiple, mutually inconsistent ways to
divide a surplus. Bargaining problems with multiple equilibria result in a partic-
ularly difficult strategy coordination problem, because people may fundamentally
disagree about the desirability of the different equilibria. Many economists thought
that bargaining problems were inherently intractable; see Edgeworth (1881) for an
early formalization of the problem. Many equilibrium selection principles have been
proposed to select a unique equilibrium including Utilitarian (select the equilibrium
with the largest payoff sum), Rawlsian (select the equilibrium that maximizes the
welfare of the worst off player), and risk dominance (select the equilibrium with
the larger basin of attraction). However, Carlsson and van Damme (1993b) show
that if we introduce noise to the payoffs, creating incomplete information versions of
standard bargaining problems called global bargaining games, there exists a unique
equilibrium that is typically the equilibrium selected by risk dominance. Therefore,
we would expect risk dominance to be more salient under incomplete information.
This paper reports an experiment where each subject plays a sequence of per-
turbed bargaining games in one of two information conditions: complete and incom-
plete information. The bargaining game models a situation in which players have
two ways to divide a surplus: if both players select the same choice, the surplus is
divided according to that particular choice. However, if two players fail to coordinate
on the same choice and select different choices, each player earns a small fixed payoff.
In most games, there are two strict equilibria, one of which is risk-dominant. The
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Table 3.1: A Class of Bargaining Games
A B
A W,X 100, 100
B 100, 100 Y, Z
results show that risk dominance performs the best in predicting subjects’ choices.
Moreover, risk dominance (which is also a global games prediction) is more salient
under incomplete information. The results also imply that the “social preferences”
of groups differ under different information conditions.
The class of bargaining games depicted in Table 3.1 models a situation in which
players have two choices, A and B, to divide a surplus. If players select the same
choice, the surplus is divided according to that particular choice. However, if two
players select different choices, each player earns a fixed but small payoff for a misco-
ordination. This results in a multiplicity of Nash equilibria: (A,A) or (B,B). Which
equilibrium will be selected by the players would depend on the payoffs according
to each equilibrium; i.e., the values of W,X, Y, Z. There are at least three equi-
librium selection principles that have been proposed to select a unique equilibrium:
Utilitarian , Rawlsian, and risk dominance. Utilitarian selects the equilibrium with
the largest payoff sum; Rawlsian selects the equilibrium that maximizes the welfare
of the worst off player; and risk dominance selects the equilibrium with the larger
basin of attraction.1 It is unclear which of the three principles is the most salient in
predicting players’ behavior in a bargaining game.
However, in many situations, subjects may not be able to observe payoffs with
precision.2 There is some evidence that players behave differently in games with com-
plete and incomplete information. Therefore, I introduce noise to the payoffs, as in
1In a 2× 2 game, a basin of attraction refers to a product of deviation losses
2For example, a buyers and a seller may not know each other’s willingness to buy or to sell.
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the theory of global games introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993b). In global
bargaining games, each player independently observes the payoffs of W,X, Y, Z, with
noise in each period. Carlsson and van Damme (1993b) show that under certain con-
ditions, there exists a unique equilibrium that is often the equilibrium selected by risk
dominance. Neither Utilitarian equilibrium nor Rawlsian equilibrium exists under
incomplete information since players may observe different payoffs which can lead
to different strategies. Therefore, I would expect risk dominance to be more salient
under incomplete information.
Given different theoretical predictions under the two information conditions, I
conduct an experiment where each subject plays a series of perturbed bargaining
games in one of two treatments: complete information and incomplete information.
Under complete information, subjects observe the actual payoffs with certainty while
under incomplete information, subjects only observe the payoffs with noise that is
uniformly distributed with zero mean.
The results show that the Rawlsian principle performs better than the Utilitar-
ian principle in predicting subjects’ choices under both conditions. Risk dominance
performs the best under both information conditions, but it is not statistically dif-
ferent from Rawlsian under the complete information condition. One approach to
analyzing the behavior of subjects is to classify them by type. Foe example, those
whose bahavior is consistent with the Utilitarian principle would be classified as the
Utilitarian type. We use a finite mixture model regression to estimate the fraction
of behavior that is consistent with each type. Half of the subjects under complete
information and two thirds of the subjects under incomplete information can be clas-
sified, using a finite mixture model of subject types, as the risk dominance type. The
results support the global games theory, which predicts a unique equilibrium, risk
dominance, in the game with incomplete information. The results also imply that
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different behavior may occur when subjects observe different information; players
may select equilibria with different criteria under different information conditions.
To my knowledge, this paper is the first to compare three equilibrium selection
principles and examine the predictions of global game theory in bargaining games. It
is also the first to compare the results of the game with complete information to those
with incomplete information. The closest paper to mine, Van Huyck and Battalio
(2002), only examines the bargaining game under complete information. Moreover,
they vary the payoffs with special properties: all games have two strict, efficient
equilibria in which the Rawlsian principle selects one equilibrium and the Utilitarian
principle selects another equilibrium. Security is varied so that risk dominance selects
the Utilitarian equilibrium half the time and the Rawlsian half the time. They
observe, in contrast with my paper, more emergence of a Utilitarian convention than
a Rawlsian convention, and there is no emergence of a risk dominance convention.
In summary, this paper considers a sequence of perturbed bargaining games in
two treatments: complete information and incomplete information. The results show
that risk dominance is best in predicting choices; comparing between Rawlsian and
Utilitarian principles, the strategies are more consistent with Rawlsian than Util-
itarian . Moreover, risk dominance is more salient under incomplete information
than complete information. This supports the global games theory which predicts
a unique equilibrium, in games with incomplete information, to be the same as the
risk-dominant equilibrium. The results also suggest that players may use different
strategies against games with different information conditions.
3.2 Related Literature
There is a great deal of on bargaining experiments. Most studies consider a
single fixed game where players bargain over a fixed sum of payoffs; see Roth (1995)
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and (Camerer, 2003, p. 151-198) for surveys. Most experimental results show that
splitting surplus equally is a salient norm (the 50-50 norm); see Janssen (2006) and
Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) for example. One exception is the experiments by
Van Huyck et al. (1995) where participants play symmetric bargaining games with the
same earnings matrix every period. In their DS game, they observe unequal-division
conventions emerging even though equal-division is an efficient strict equilibrium.
They argue that security reduces the salience of the equal division and can drive a
laboratory cohort toward an unequal division convention.
Most experimental work on bargaining (and other games) considers a single fixed
game. Crawford (2002) argues that “real analogies are seldom this perfect and how
players learn from others’ behavior in games that are similar but not identical is
an important open question”.3 Van Huyck and Battalio (2002) study a class of
2 × 2 asymmetric bargaining games. In their experiments, participants play simi-
lar, but not identical, bargaining games for 70 periods. All games have two strict
efficient equilibria in which the Rawlsian principle selects one equilibrium and the
Utilitarian principle selects another equilibrium. Risk dominance selects a Utilitar-
ian equilibrium in odd periods (U -games) and a Rawlsian in even periods (R-games).
In contrast to my paper, they observe more emergence of the Utilitarian convention
than either the Rawlsian or risk dominance convention. From 26 eight-person co-
horts, four cohorts converge to the Utilitarian convention for both U and R games
while only one cohort converges to the Rawlsian convention for both U and R games.
There is no cohort that converges to the risk dominance convention in which it con-
verges to the Utilitarian convention for U games and to Rawlsian convention for R
games. If considering either U -games or R-games separately, 15 cohorts converge to
3Rankin, Van Huyck and Battalio (2000) opened an investigation of this issue with similar stag
hunt games.
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the Utilitarian convention for U -games while only 8 cohorts converge to the Rawlsian
convention for R-games.
Our paper is also related to Charness and Rabin (2002) who study two-person
dictator games. In my experiments, two players decide simultaneously between two
choices. One player needs to sacrifice some of his payoffs to coordinate on the same
choice with another player, in order for both players to receive higher payoffs than
the disagreement payoffs. However, in Charness and Rabin (2002) only one player
(a dictator) can choose between two allocations. They show that many subjects are
willing to sacrifice some of their payoffs to help their counterparts. For example,
about half of the subjects select (375,750) over (400,400) and about one third of the
subjects select (500,700) over (600,300).4
Lastly, this paper is also related to the global games theory. Most of the ex-
perimental literature testing global games predictions focuses on variations of the
speculative attack model of Morris and Shin (1998). Heinemann, Nagel and Ock-
enfels (2004) is the first experimental paper to test this prediction; they find that
subjects use different strategies under complete information but similar strategies
under incomplete information.
3.3 Analytical Framework
In order to focus the analysis, consider the following game. Table 3.1 describes
the game where two players make a decision simultaneously between choice A and
choice B. If both players select A (B), the row player will earn W (Y ) and the column
player will earn X (Z). If two players select different choices (i.e., one player selects
choice A and another player selects choice B), each of them earns a fixed payoff
of 100 as a disagreement payoff. When W,X, Y, Z are greater than a disagreement
4For number in parentheses (A,B): A refers to the payoff of the dictator and B refers to the
payoff of the other player.
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payoff of 100, there exist two strict Nash equilibria which are (A,A) and (B,B). If
W > Y and X > Z, both players prefer an equilibrium (A,A). In this situation, it is
obvious that A will be selected by both players. To avoid these situations, I assume
W to be greater than both Y and Z; and X to be smaller than both Y and Z; i.e.,
Y, Z ∈ (X,W ). In this case, the row player earns higher payoff with (A,A) while the
column player earns higher payoff with (B,B).
3.3.1 Equilibrium Selection Principles
In a bargaining game shown in Table 3.1, there are two strict equilibria in pure
strategies: (A,A) and (B,B). Many equilibrium selection principles have been pro-
posed to select an equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria. One of the prin-
ciples that has been widely used is payoff dominance. It compares the efficiency of
equilibria and selects the equilibrium that all players earn the most. In this game,
because the row player earns more with (A,A) while the column player earns more
with (B,B); there is no payoff-dominant equilibrium.
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) develop risk dominance as the selection criterion when
payoff dominance fails to make a unique prediction. In 2× 2 games, risk dominance
is equivalent to choosing the equilibrium with the larger basin of attraction under
best-response dynamics.5 In other words, it selects the equilibrium with the larger
product of the deviation losses. In this game, risk dominance selects (A,A) when
(W−100)×(X−100) > (Y−100)×(Z−100) and (B,B) when (W−100)×(X−100) <
(Y − 100)× (Z − 100).
There are at least two other equilibrium selection principles that have been widely
used in bargaining contents: Rawlsian and Utilitarian. The Rawlsian principle
(Rawls (1971)) selects the equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of the worst off
5This prediction is the same to Nash’s bargaining solution (Nash (1951)) which compares the
product of utility differences between the agreement and the disagreement point.
47
Table 3.2: A Class of Global Bargaining Games (a, left) Actual Payoff Table; (b,
right) Subject i’s Estimated Payoff Table.
A B
A W,X 100, 100
B 100, 100 Y, Z
A B
A Wi, Xi 100, 100
B 100, 100 Yi, Zi
player; it selects (B,B) in this game because Y and Z are both greater than X. The
Utilitarian principle selects the equilibrium with the largest payoff sum; it selects
(A,A) when W +X > Y + Z and (B,B) when W +X < Y + Z.
With these three equilibrium selection principles, all games have one of the three
possibilities: (1) all three principles select (B,B); (2) Utilitarian selects (A,A) while
Rawlsian and risk dominance select (B,B); and (3) Utilitarian and risk dominance
select (A,A) while Rawlsian selects (B,B). Note that (1) Rawlsian always selects
(B,B) since Y and Z are both greater than X; and (2) the case in which risk
dominance selects (A,A) while Rawlsian and Utilitarian select (B,B) is not possible.6
3.3.2 Global Bargaining Games
Carlsson and van Damme (1993b) develop an equilibrium selection theory (a
global game) based on the idea that the payoff parameters of a game cannot be
observed with certainty. The complete information bargaining game in Table 3.1 is
replaced by a payoff perturbed game: a global bargaining game, as in Table 3.2. The
global game can be described by the following steps:
1. Nature selects W,X, Y, Z.
6Suppose that Utilitarian selects (B,B), we know that Y +Z > W +X. Because Y,Z ∈ (X,W )
and let W = a+Y where a is a constant; we have Z > X+a. We can construct (Y−100)×(Z−100) >
(W − 100− a)× (X − 100 + a) = (W − 100)× (X − 100) + a(W −X − a) > (W − 100)× (X − 100)
since W − a = Y > X. Therefore, (Y − 100)× (Z− 100 > (W − 100)× (X − 100). In this case, risk
dominance would select (B,B). This implies that if Utilitarian and Rawlsian agree on the same
equilibrium, risk dominance would predict that equilibrium as well.
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2. Each player independently observes W,X, Y, Z with some noise, so we denote
them as Wi, Xi, Yi, Zi for subject i.
3. Each player chooses between A and B simultaneously.
4. Each player receives payoffs as determined by the game form in step 1 and all
players’ choices in step 3.
In other words, player i observes a game on Table 3.2b but the payoffs are de-
termined by a game on Table 3.2a. Carlsson and van Damme (1993b) show that for
any 2×2 game, under some restrictions, iterated elimination of dominated strategies
in the global game forces each player to select an equilibrium equivalent to the risk
dominance criterion. The restrictions are (1) the initial subclass of games is large
enough and contains games with different equilibrium structures, and (2) the noise
is independently distributed and is sufficiently small. 7
Under incomplete information (i.e., global bargaining games), there exists a
unique equilibrium that is the same as the equilibrium derived from the risk domi-
nance criterion. Other equilibrium selection principles including Rawlsian and Util-
itarian are no longer equilibria because observing different parameters can lead to
different choices.
A global game does not imply that players always coordinate on the risk-dominant
equilibrium of the actual game even though they play the same strategies. In fact,
each player selects the risk-dominant equilibrium according to each player’s estimated
payoff game, which may end up with different strategies in some situations. However,
coordination on the actual game is ensured when noise vanishes.
7See Carlsson and van Damme (1993b) for details of the proof.
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3.3.3 Non-Equilibrium Concepts
Experimental evidence suggests that people often deviate systematically from
equilibrium, especially when they have no experience with the game. Stahl and
Wilson (1994, 1995) and Nagel (1995) introduce a non-equilibrium model based on
level-k thinking. In this model, level-0 thinkers play uniformly over their action
set, level-1 thinkers best respond to a belief that everyone else is a level-0 thinker,
level-2 thinkers best respond to a belief that everyone else is a level-1 thinker, and
so on. In this bargaining game, level 0 thinkers would play A and B with equal
probability. A level 1 row player would choose A because her expected payoff of
playing A, (0.5×W ) + (0.5× 100), is higher than her expected payoff of playing B,
(0.5×100) + (0.5×Y ) since W > Y . Similarly, a level 1 column player would choose
B since Z > X. Level 2 row players would match the choice of level 1 column player
and choose B, while level 2 column players would choose A. Therefore, odd-step
thinkers (level 1, 3, 5, ... ) select T if playing as row players and select B if playing
as column players, while even-step thinkers (level 2, 4, 6, ... ) select B if playing as
row players and select A if playing as column players. A pair will select the same
choice when the difference between their levels is an odd number and different choices
when it is an even number.8
An even more naive theory is maximax, where a player attempts to earn the
maximum possible benefit available as if all other players will also act so as to
maximize her payoff. In other words, player i picks the strategy si which maximizes
a payoff gi(si, s−i) over all possible (si, s−i) ∈ Si×S−i. In previous chapter, the most
common strategy described in the debriefing questionnaire of a global stag hunt game
was maximax. In the global bargaining game, maximax results in the row player
8If at least one player is a step-0 thinker, the coordination will be successful half of the time.
50
selecting A and the column player selecting B; that is, it results in discoordination,
unlike the global stag hunt game. Hence, if players bring this decision rule into the
laboratory they will have to then learn a more sophisticated strategy to successfully
coordinate on a pure strategy equilibrium.
3.4 Experimental Design
To accommodate the requirement of global games theory that the initial subclass
of games contains games with different equilibrium structures, I let the values of W,
X, Y , and Z used in the experiment to be integers in the interval 0 to 600, that
is, W,X, Y, Z ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 600}. In order to compare a treatment with complete
information to a treatment with incomplete information, I used the same values under
both conditions. The stage game form used in the experiment is given in Table 3.3.
participants in a treatment with complete information observed the actual payoff
table as in Table 3.3a, while participants in a treatment with incomplete information
only observed the estimated payoff table as in Table 3.3b.
The stage game was played for 100 periods to give adequate experience to learn
to solve a multiple equilibria problem. In each period, four values were generated
using a uniform distribution between 0 and 600. Since I have a restriction that
Y, Z ∈ (X,W ), I set W equal to the largest value, X equal to the smallest value, and
Y and Z equal to either the second or the third largest value (with equal probability).
In each period, each player was assigned a role as either a row or a column player;
however, the payoff table was shown on each player’s screen as if he/she was always
a row player. In addition, action labels were also scrambled to prevent players from
using non-strategic details to solve their coordination problem.
Two treatments were conducted in this paper. In the baseline treatment of com-
plete information about the payoff table, every player observed the actual table; that
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Table 3.3: A Global Bargaining Game Form Used in the Experiment (600 > W >
{Y, Z} > X > 0) (a, left) Actual Payoff Table; (b, right) Subject i’s Estimated
Payoff Table.
A B
A W,X 100, 100
B 100, 100 Y, Z
A B
A Wi, Xi 100, 100
B 100, 100 Yi, Zi
is Wi = W , Xi = X, Yi = Y and Zi = Z. In the incomplete information treatment,
the payoff table was only observed with noise. Each player i observes the private
estimate values of W,X, Y, Z, which we denote Wi, Xi, Yi, Zi. The private value of
Wi was Wi ∈ {W − 50,W − 49, . . . ,W + 49,W + 50}. Note that Wi and Wj, for
players i and j, were generated separately, and they were very likely to be different
values in each period. The private values of Xi, Yi, Zi were generated in the same
manner as Wi. So, in each period, 32 error terms (integers between -50 and 50) were
generated: four values (for W,X, Y, Z) for each of eight players in a cohort. The same
sequence of the actual payoff tables was used for all cohorts under both information
treatments, and the same sequence of the error terms was used in all cohorts under
the incomplete information treatment. The only difference between the two treat-
ments was that players in the incomplete information treatment observed the payoff
tables with errors, while players in the complete information treatment observed the
actual payoff tables.
Each participant was randomly matched with a new counterpart in each period,
within a cohort of eight participants. After each period, each participant received
feedback on the actual payoff table (for the incomplete information treatment), her
and her counterpart’s choices, and the earnings for that period for her and her
counterpart. Participants were paid for all 100 periods with the exchange rate of 12
points for a cent.
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Two sessions of three cohorts and one session of two cohorts for a total of eight co-
horts were conducted for each treatment. Each cohort consisted of eight participants.
Thus, each treatment has 64 participants and the total number of participants was
128. The participants were Texas A&M University undergraduate students recruited
campus wide using ORSEE, see Greiner (2004).
The instructions were both shown on screen and read aloud to ensure the game
was common information among the participants. After the instructions, the partic-
ipants filled out a questionnaire to establish that they knew how to calculate their
earnings. In sessions with any mistakes on any questionnaires, the section on calcu-
lating earnings was reread to the participants to ensure that they understood how
to play the game.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree, see
Fischbacher (2007). The experiment was conducted in the Economic Research Lab-
oratory (ERL) at Texas A&M University in June 2013. A five dollar show up payment
plus their earnings in the session were paid privately to the participants in cash. The
average earnings is $25.54 for a session that lasted about 2 hours.
After the decision making portion of the session was completed and while they
waited for their earnings to be calculated, participants filled out a second question-
naire that asked them to explain their behavior in the session.
3.5 Experimental Results
Subjects in my experiments played a sequence of 100 global bargaining games.
Because I allowed the agreement payoffs to be less than 100, in some games there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium as either (A,B) or (B,B).9 Sections 5.1 and 5.2
consider basic results and type classification, respectively. Section 5.3 reports a
9Since I scrambled the action labels, (A,B) may be labeled (B,A) and (B,B) may be labeled
(A,A).
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Table 3.4: Percentages of Decisions that Comply with Each Equilibrium Selection
Principle by Cohorts
Cohort Treatment Risk Dominance Utilitarian Rawlsian Maximax
1 Incomplete 73% 66% 57% 52%
2 Incomplete 68% 52% 76% 51%
3 Incomplete 72% 57% 74% 55%
4 Incomplete 65% 54% 63% 50%
5 Incomplete 77% 68% 61% 53%
6 Incomplete 72% 57% 68% 53%
7 Incomplete 70% 60% 63% 60%
8 Incomplete 75% 64% 64% 54%
1-8 Average 71% 60% 66% 54%
9 Complete 73% 65% 63% 56%
10 Complete 68% 48% 80% 50%
11 Complete 68% 54% 73% 51%
12 Complete 68% 56% 68% 55%
13 Complete 71% 60% 68% 54%
14 Complete 68% 65% 63% 50%
15 Complete 67% 56% 73% 52%
16 Complete 72% 65% 65% 53%
9-16 Average 69% 59% 69% 53%
debriefing questionnaire about how subjects played this game.
3.5.1 Basic Results
A useful way to look at the data is to look at how accurate each equilibrium
selection principle is in predicting players’ choices. We will consider only the periods
that the earnings table has Wi > {Yi, Zi} > Xi > 100 because there are two strict
Nash Equilibria and these equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. Fifty-three games
under complete information and thirty-five to forty-five games under incomplete
information have this property.10 If we randomly select a choice, either A or B,
10Under incomplete information, each player observes different estimate earnings table, that is
why the number of games that satisfy my restriction are different.
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made by a player in each period, we should have a correct prediction half of the
time. Since each selection principle predicts one choice in each period, it makes a
good prediction if it has a correct prediction significantly greater than 50%. Table
3.4 reports the percentage of correct prediction for each selection principle by cohort
for the incomplete information treatment and the complete information treatment,
respectively.
Cohorts 1 to 8 were conducted under the incomplete information condition. No
selection principle can predict the decisions perfectly, and most participants used a
combination of principles. Each method was used more than 50% of the time, which
means that it performed better than a random selection. The global games pre-
diction, which is equivalent to the risk dominance criterion, has the highest correct
prediction for six cohorts, excluding cohorts 2 and 3 in which the Rawlsian principle
makes a slightly better prediction (but it is not significantly different from the risk
dominance criterion). On average, players selected the global games choices about
71% of the time. It is surprising that the Utilitarian principle, which generates the
highest payoff over time, performs much worse than risk dominance and Rawlsian.
Comparing between Rawlsian and Utilitarian principles, players selected the Rawl-
sian choices more often (66% compared to 60%). Rawlsian makes a better prediction
than Utilitarian for 6 cohorts, excluding cohorts 1 and 5. Maximax performs the
worst in every cohort; the correct prediction rate is a little over 50%. This is prob-
ably because of the fact that, if every player used the maximax strategy, it is very
likely that it will result in a mismatch, and each of them would earn only 100 points
for that period.
Cohorts 9 to 16 were conducted under the complete information conditions. Co-
hort 10 is perhaps the most remarkable. More than 80% of the choices made by
cohort 10’s players were consistent with Rawlsian and less than 50% were consistent
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with the Utilitarian principle. This cohort showed a very strong tendency toward the
Rawlsian principle. For other cohorts, the Utilitarian principle predicts the choices
better than Rawlsian for only two cohorts, cohort 9 and cohort 14. The choices made
by cohorts 9, 13 and 16 were consistent with risk dominance by more than 70% of
the time.
3.5.2 Type Classification
We follow Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta (2001) to conduct a maximum
likelihood error-rate analysis for my participants’ choices. The model is a finite
mixture model in which each participant’s type is drawn from a common prior dis-
tribution over three types, which are risk dominance, Utilitarian, and Rawlsian and
remains constant for the whole session.11
Let i = 1, ..., N index the participants in the treatment and let k = 1, ..., 3 index
types. We assume that each player normally follows the predictions of a particular
type, but in each game he makes an error with probability k ∈ [0, 1], type k’s error
rate. With probability k, a participant makes choices randomly which means he
selects either A or B with probability 0.5. For a type-k participant, the probability
of type k’s decision is 1− 0.5k and the probability of another decision is 0.5k.
The likelihood function can be constructed as follows. Let Qi denote the total
number of games for player i that I include in my analysis.12 Let xik denote the
number of games that player i makes a choice that is consistent with type k. Let pk
denote participants’ common prior type probabilities where p1 + p2 + p3 = 1, and let
k denote type k’s error rate. Participant i’s log-likelihood function with a particular
11We have tried four types including maximax type; the results suggest no player is a maximax
type.
12We only include the games that satisfy Wi > Yi, Zi > Xi > 100 in this analysis. There are 53
games for the complete information treatment and 35 to 45 games for the incomplete information
treatment.
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Table 3.5: Aggregate Type Classification (Type 1 is Risk Dominance, Type 2 is
Utilitarian, and Type 3 is Rawlsian).
Treatment Incomplete Complete
p1 0.6648 0.5256
(0.1260) (0.0498)
p2 0.0894 0.1085
(0.0281) (0.0342)
p3 0.2458 0.3659
- -
1 0.5071 0.5133
(0.3700) (0.0261)
2 0.7845 0.7214
(0.1139) (0.0920)
3 0.2561 0.3505
(0.1316) (0.0319)
N 2512 3392
sample with choice profile xi can be written as:
lnLi(p, |xi) = ln
[
3∑
k=1
pk
∏
(1− 0.5k)xik(0.5k)Qi−xik
]
. (3.1)
The aggregate log-likelihood function is given by:
lnL(p, |x) =
N∑
i=1
ln
[
3∑
k=1
pk
∏
(1− 0.5k)xik(0.5k)Qi−xik
]
(3.2)
With three types, this model has 5 independent parameters to estimate: 2 inde-
pendent type probabilities pk
13 and 3 independent error rates k.
Table 3.5 estimates equation (2) using maximum likelihood for incomplete in-
formation and complete information treatments separately. Under incomplete in-
formation conditions, the risk dominance type makes up two-third of the estimated
type distribution. The Rawlsian type makes up one-quarter and the Utilitarian type
13We do not estimate p3 as p3 = 1− (p1 + p2).
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makes up less than 10% of the type distribution. The results are consistent with
Table 3.3 where most choices are consistent with risk dominance. Error rates are
quite high which suggests that players do not follow their types consistently. This is
not surprising given that the expected payoff from two equilibria are similar in many
games. The Risk dominance type follows its type’s action about 49% while Rawlsian
type follow its type’s action about 74%.
Under complete information, risk dominance type makes up about 53% of the
estimated type distribution. Rawlsian makes up 37% and Utilitarian makes up a
little over 10% of type distribution. The result under two conditions are similar.
The main difference is I observe higher proportion of participants as risk dominance
types under the incomplete information condition than the complete information
condition. This suggests that incomplete information makes risk dominance or the
global games solution become more salient.
3.5.3 Debriefing Questionnaire
After the 100 choices were made, the participants were asked to complete a de-
briefing questionnaire consisting of four questions. The first question was, “What
strategy did you use while playing this game? Please include details about what led
you to choose A or B.” The answers were revealing. We cannot categorize many
participants because their answers were not clear about the criteria they were using
to make a decision. A typical answer was, “I tried to choose the answer I thought the
other participant would choose.” Many choices were consistent with risk dominance;
however, no participant mentioned risk dominance. This is not surprising because we
do not expect them to report that they select “the outcome with the larger product
of the deviation losses” or “the equilibrium with the larger basin of attraction under
best response dynamics” anyway.
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Despite a high rate of uncategorized answers, many answers can be categorize
as Rawlsian, Utilitarian, or maximax. Thirty-four percent of the participants in
the incomplete information treatment and thirty-nine percent of the participants in
the complete information treatment mentioned equality or maximizing the payoff of
the worst-off player (Rawlsian). For example, a participant reported, “I tried to be
fair and chose the outcomes that would be the most equal.” Only eleven percent
of the participants in the incomplete information treatment and nine percent of the
participants in the complete information treatment said they selected the choice with
the larger sum of the payoffs (Utilitarian). For example, a participant reported, “I
would pick the highest combined number. So if choice A had a higher total than
choice B when I would add up the numbers I would choose choice A.” Nine percent
of the participants in each treatment reported using maximax as one participant
reported, “I chose the highest number on the left side of the box because that was
how much I was going to earn.”
The second debriefing question was, “Did you change your strategy over time?”
Forty-seven percent of the participants in the incomplete information treatment and
forty-four of the participants in the complete information treatment reported chang-
ing their strategy over time.
The third debriefing question question was, “If you changed your strategy, what
made you change it?” The typical answer was to try to coordinate better with other
players after their initial strategies did not work out well. For example, a participant
reported, “I had to adapt my strategy because evidently many other people don’t
know how game theory works. I had to try to put myself in their shoes and think
about what they were going to pick and adjust my pick accordingly. I feel that the
end result would have been much better if I would have taken the uneducated route
the whole time.” Some participants were frustrated about other players’ choices so
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they decided to change their strategies as one participant reported, “There were a
few people in my group who would refuse to give up 10 or 20 points so that the other
person could double theirs. That made me pretty frustrated, so after that I was less
charitable.”
The last question asked participants, “If you could play this game again, what
would you do?” Forty-three percent answered that they would do the same thing.
Thirty percent answered that they would begin with their strategy that they adopted
at the end of the session earlier. Some participants reported that they would use
a maximax strategy in every period.14 Other frequently mentioned answers include
wishing that other players would choose the choices that they expect, or they could
eliminate those who play irrationally.
3.6 Conclusion
Bargaining problems usually result in multiple ways to divide a surplus. Many
equilibrium selection principles have been proposed to select a unique equilibrium.
However, once we introduce noise as in global games theory, only the risk-dominant
criterion survives as the equilibrium selection principle. This paper tests the salience
of this prediction. Therefore, I run an experiment where each subject plays a sequence
of perturbed bargaining games with either complete or incomplete information. The
results show that risk dominance can explain the strategies of subjects better than
either Rawlsian and Utilitarian under both information conditions. Risk dominance
is more salient in sessions with incomplete information than sessions with complete
information which supports the global games theory.
One may be interested in whether the Rawlsian or Utilitarian principles is more
salient. The results from a debriefing questionnaire reveals that more people have
14The typical words using for a maximax strategy were “play selfishly” or “play aggressively”.
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preferences toward Rawlsian than Utilitarian; more than one third of answers from
subjects can be classified as the Rawlsian type, with only ten percent as the Utilitar-
ian type. This is consistent with the real decisions in the experiment as the Rawlsian
principle can explain the choices better than the Utilitarian principle under both
information conditions.
The fact that risk dominance is more salient under incomplete information also
suggests that players may use different strategies in games with different information
conditions. The implied “social preferences” of people are different under different
information conditions. Incomplete information can change people with different
strategies to use similar strategies in bargaining games. One open question is what
drives people under two different information conditions to play differently.
It is not easy to coordinate in my bargaining games as the results show that the
miscoordination rate is very high (almost one-third under complete information and
even higher under incomplete information). Testing behavior in other bargaining
games, especially when it is easier to coordinate, is worth considering.
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4. EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GLOBAL ENTRY GAMES WITH
STRATEGIC SUBSTITUTES AND COMPLEMENTS
4.1 Introduction
Previous experimental work has shown that when playing a sequence of global
entry games, most subjects deviate from the global games predictions in favor of
payoff dominance, i.e., they enter the market more often than theoretical predictions,
see Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2004) and Cornand (2006) for example. These
results were documented in an environment with strategic complements only, i.e.,
there is a non-decreasing function between the payoffs from entering the market and
the number of firms who enter the market. Karp, Lee and Mason (2007) analyze
an entry game with strategic substitutes and complements where the relationship
between the payoffs from entering the market and the number of firms who enter
the market is an increasing function in some regions and a decreasing function in
other regions. They show that under incomplete information with certain conditions,
there exists a unique threshold equilibrium in which firms enter the market when the
observed fundamental value is above a certain threshold and do not enter the market
otherwise. In contrast to games with incomplete information, there are multiple
equilibria in games with complete information. With both strategic substitutes and
complements, over-entry does not yield higher payoffs than the equilibrium strategy.
This is in contrast with the usual entry games with strategic complements only,
where deviating from the equilibrium strategy might yield higher payoffs.
In this chapter, I conduct an experiment where each subject plays a sequence
of perturbed entry games with strategic substitutes and complements in one of two
treatments: one with complete and one with incomplete information. Under com-
62
Table 4.1: A Class of Entry Games where Q ∈ [0, 400]
No. of choice A 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
A Q Q+ 50 Q+ 100 Q+ 200 Q+ 100 Q+ 50 Q
B 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
plete information, subjects’ strategies vary, which is consistent with the predictions
of multiple equilibria. Under incomplete information, subjects deviate from the equi-
librium, but in a different way from previous studies with entry games with strategic
complements only. They enter the market less often than the theoretical prediction,
which is consistent with risk-averse behavior since entering the market is risky. Thus
in the absence of payoff dominance, global games can predict subjects’ behavior
better than when there is a payoff dominance.
The class of entry game with strategic substitutes and complements, depicted in
Table 4.1, models a situation in which symmetric players have two choices: A, enter
the market, and B, do not enter the market. Choosing B and staying out of the
market guarantees a payoff of 300 regardless of other players’ choices. If a person
chooses A and enters the market, the payoff depends on Q and the number of other
players who choose to enter the market, as shown in the table. An example of a game
with these properties is a market with both positive network effects and congestion.
In such a market, positive network effects may make it more attractive for a firm to
enter a new market if few other firms also enter. However, if a large number of firms
enter, the market becomes too crowded and further entry is unattractive.
Given the fact that it is more attractive to choose A when Q is high, I expect
players to play “threshold” strategies where the players choose A if Q > Q∗ and B
if Q ≤ Q∗. However, under complete information conditions, in which all payoffs are
common knowledge, using the same thresholds will not benefit players because the
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results will be either all or no players in the market. The payoffs are minimized in
that situation; therefore, I expect different players to use different thresholds.
In contrast to games with complete information, there exists a unique threshold
in games with incomplete information under certain conditions. Under incomplete
informtaion, the fundamental state variable (Q) cannot be observed with certainty:
each player observes an independent signal of Q. In this game, there exists a unique
threshold where players enter the market when observing Q ≥ 182. This is from the
fact that, even when subjects use the same threshold, observing different signals of
Q can lead to different choices. This benefits players, since the payoffs from entering
are higher when about half of people enter the market.
Previous experimental research on entry games with strategic complements demon-
strates that subjects deviate from the global games predictions in favor of payoff
dominance; they choose A more often than theoretical predictions. Deviating from
the predictions is reasonable in those games because doing so can generate higher
payoffs for subjects. However, in this paper, no payoff dominance exists in games
with incomplete information, and deviating from the equilibrium threshold does not
yield higher payoffs as there are congestion effects. Therefore, I expect that subjects
will not select A more often than the equilibrium predictions as observed in previous
papers. In fact, I expect that subjects would select A less often than equilibrium
because selecting A is risky.
Given different theoretical predictions, I compare a sequence of entry games with
strategic substitutes and complements in two treatments: complete information and
incomplete information. Under complete information treatment, subjects observe
the actual value of q with certainty, while under incomplete information treatment,
subjects observe the value of q with noise that is uniformly distributed with zero
mean.
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Our results show that under complete information, subjects use different thresh-
olds as expected. Under incomplete information, subjects use similar thresholds but
are higher than theoretical predictions. This is in contrast with entry games with
strategic complements which indicates that subjects use lower thresholds than theo-
retical predictions. Thus my results indicate that without payoff dominance, players
do not over-select risky options.
To my knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the predictions of global
games theory in the entry games with strategic substitutes and complements.
In summary, this paper considers a sequence of perturbed entry games with strate-
gic substitutes and complements in two treatments: complete information and in-
complete information. There is an evidence of multiple equilibria in games with
complete information. In contrast, subjects under incomplete information treatment
play similar thresholds which are higher than theoretical predictions but consistent
with risk-averse behavior.
4.2 Analytical Framework
Consider the entry game with strategic substitutes and complements given in
Table 4.1, which is played by 7 identical players. Let i index the player. The
players simultaneously choose between A, enter the market, and B, do not enter the
market. The secure choice of do not enter the market, B, guarantees a payoff of
300 regardless of other players’ choices. If a person chooses to enter the market, A,
the payoff depends on the fundamental state variable, Q, and the number of other
players who choose to enter the market. Players who choose A receive the highest
payoff when 3 other players also choose A; the payoff is lower as the number of other
players who choose A is further away from 3.
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4.2.1 Equilibrium with Complete Information
Under complete information, there is a unique dominance solvable equilibrium
when Q is less than 100, all players play B, or when Q is more than 300, all players
play A. Multiple equilibria exist when Q ∈ (100, 300). Two symmetric equilibria are
the following: (1) All players choose B; (2) Each player plays a mixed strategy in
which all players have the same probability of choosing A for the same value of Q.
There are also many asymmetric equilibria.
When Q < 300, all players choosing B is a symmetric equilibrium in secure
strategies. Players who choose B receive a payoff 300 regardless of all other players’
choice. Three-hundred is greater than the payoff that a player would receive if she
chose A, because if no other player or all other players chose A, she would receive a
payoff Q which is less than 300. No player has an incentive to change the strategy
because if she deviates and selects A, her payoff would be Q which is less than 300,
the payoff if she chose B.
There exists strict asymmetric Nash equilibria in which 4 players choose A when
Q ∈ (100, 200), 5 players choose A when Q ∈ [200, 250), and 6 players choose A
when Q ∈ [250, 300). Consider a case where Q = 120, each of 4 players who selects
A receives a payoff Q + 200 = 320 and players who select B receive a payoff 300.
Each player who selects A has no incentive to deviate to B because it results in a
lower payoff of 300. Each player who selects B also has no incentive to deviate to A
because it results in 5 players selecting A, which lowers their payoff to Q+100 = 220,
less than 300 from choosing B.1 A similar argument can be made for all the other
1Note that an outcome in which 1, 2, or 3 players choose A cannot be an equilibrium. Suppose
that such an equilibrium existed, each person who selects A would receive a payoff at least 300 in
order for him not to deviate to B. If one more player selects A when there are less than 4 As would
increase the payoff for those who select A, then a person who previously chose B would want to
deviate to A. Therefore, no equilibrium has 1, 2, or 3 players choosing A.
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values of Q. In these asymmetric equilibria, players receive different expected payoffs.
Players who select A receive a higher payoff than those who select B. The strategy
coordination problem is severe in these asymmetric equilibria, because they require
the right number of players to select A and B given Q and the right number of
players are different for different values of Q.
Since this game is symmetric, a more accurate equilibrium prediction might be
the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. Let pi denote the probability that player
i chooses A. In a symmetric strategy combination all players use the same mixed
strategy pi = p. In order for each player to play a mixed strategy, the expected payoffs
from choosing A and B must be equal. For Q ≤ 181, there is no such equilibrium
since the expected payoffs from choosing A is less than 300 for any p.2
For Q = 182, there exists an equilibrium with p = 0.53. The value of p is higher
when the value of Q is higher and it approaches 1 when Q approaches 300. This
equilibrium has a monotonic relationship (an increasing function) between p and Q
for Q ∈ [182, 300].
Many experiments about global games show that many players use threshold
strategies. A threshold strategy is a strategy in which players choose B when Q < Q
∗
and choose A when Q ≥ Q∗ , and we call Q∗ a threshold. From the three types of
equilibria discussed above, only the first equilibrium (secure strategy) is a threshold
strategy. The secure strategy has a threshold of 300. One example of a threshold
strategy is maximax.3 In this game, a player selects the choice that gives the highest
possible payoff, as if all other players also act to maximize her payoff. In this game,
2The probability p that maximizes the expected payoff of choosing A is 0.5 for any values of Q.
With p = 0.5, the expected payoff of choosing A is Q + 118.75. This payoff is higher than 300,
the payoff of choosing B, when Q is greater than 181.25. So, no mixed strategy equilibrium exists
when Q ≤ 181.
3Van Huyck and Viriyavipart (2014) report that many subjects in their global stag hunt games
experiments used a maximax strategy.
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maximax consists of a threshold of 100, which is not an equilibrium.
Experimental evidence suggests that people often deviate systematically from
equilibrium especially when they have no experience with the game. Stahl and
Wilson (1994, 1995) and Nagel (1995) introduce a non-equilibrium model based on
level-k thinking. In this model, level-0 thinkers play uniformly, level-1 thinkers best
respond to a belief that everyone else is a level-0 thinker, level-2 thinkers best respond
to a belief that everyone else is a level-1 thinker, and so on. In this game, level-1
players have a threshold of 182 given the belief that all other players choose randomly
(level-0).4 Level-2 players will play a threshold of 300 given the belief that all other
players have a threshold of 182.5 Because the threshold of 300 is an equilibrium,
level-3 and higher level players would also play this threshold.
4.2.2 Coordination and Efficiency with Complete Information
In this game, the most efficient outcome is when 4 players choose A and 3 players
choose B when Q > 100 and all players choose B when Q ≤ 100. The average
expected payoff per period if all players can agree on this strategy, which is not an
equilibrum strategy for Q ≥ 200, is 364.34.6 The expected payoff from playing either
a secure strategy or the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which all players
use the same mixed strategy pi = p is 312.59 which is about 86% of the most efficient
outcome. The expected payoff from playing the pure-strategy equilibrium in which
4The payoff of choosing A when all other players choose A with probability 0.5 is Q+ 118.75 for
any values of Q. The best response for this believe is to choose A when Q is greater than 181.25
which is a threshold of 182. This threshold is the same threshold as the equilibrium threshold under
incomplete information.
5When all other players use the same threshold, player i’s payoff from choosing A is Q because
there are either all players or no player choosing A. Therefore, the best response for this believe is
a threshold of 300.
6If Q ≤ 100, the payoff is 300. If Q > 100, players who choose A earn Q+ 200 and players who
choose B earn 300, so the average payoff is 47 × (Q + 200) + 37 × 300 = 47Q + 242.86. This average
over the range of Q ∈ [101, 400] is 386. Therefore, the expected payoff over the whole range is
364.34.
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Table 4.2: A Class of Global Entry Games where Q ∈ [0, 400], Qi = Q + Ei where
Ei ∈ {−120,−119, ..., 0, ..., 120}
No. of choice A 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
A Qi Qi + 50 Qi + 100 Qi + 200 Qi + 100 Qi + 50 Qi
B 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
no player chooses A when Q ∈ [0, 100], 4 players choose A when Q ∈ (100, 200), 5
players choose A when Q ∈ [200, 250), 6 players choose A when Q ∈ [250, 300), and
all players choose A when Q ∈ [300, 400] is 324.45. This is about 89% of the most
efficient outcome.
4.2.3 Equilibrium Selection with Incomplete Information
In the game with incomplete information, the fundamental state variable (Q)
cannot be observed with certainty. Each player observes the incomplete information
in Table 4.2 but the actual payoffs are determined by the game in Table 4.1. Similar
to the game with complete information, the payoff from choosing B is 300, which
dominates A if Qi < 100 (the maximum expected payoff from choosing A is when 3
other players choose A, Q+ 200 which is less than 300).
Choosing A when Qi > 300 has a minimum expected payoff equals to Qi which
dominates B (when all players chose B). We can use the concept of global games to
pin down a unique equilibrium threshold in which all players choose A when Qi ≥ Q∗
and choose B when Qi < Q
∗. If a player observes Qi = Q∗, he knows that each other
player has a 50% chance to observe Qj > Q
∗and chooses A; and a 50% chance to
observe Qj < Q
∗ and chooses B. We can calculate the expected payoff of player i
choosing A when observing Qi = Q
∗ from:
EpiA(Q
∗) =
6∑
k=0
p(k) · EpiA,k(Q∗),
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where EpiA(Q
∗) is the expected payoff of choosing A when observing Q∗, p(k) is
the probability that k other players choose A, EpiA,k(Q
∗) is the expected payoff of
choosing A when observing Q∗ and k other players choose A. The probability that k
players choose A is calculated from p(k) =
6!
k!(6−k)!
26
.7 Player i’s expected payoffs from
choosing A when Qi = Q
∗ are Q∗, Q∗ + 50, Q∗ + 100, Q∗ + 200, Q∗ + 100, Q∗ + 50,
and Q∗for k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, respectively. Player i is indifferent between choosing
A and B when Qi = 181.25; therefore, Q
∗ = 182 which means that each player would
choose A when observing Qi ≥ 182 and choose B when observing Qi < 182.
All other thresholds cannot be constituted as a mutual best response or an equi-
librium for every player in the group. For example, if all other players except player
i use a threshold of 300 (a secure strategy); player i should choose A when observing
Qi = 300 since his expected payoff from playing A is 419 which is much higher than
the payoff of 300 from choosing B. His best response threshold is 233 in this case.
If all other players use a threshold less than or equal to 160, player i’s best response
threshold is 300. It is interesting that if all other players use a threshold between
161 and 178, player i’s best response is not monotonic. For example, if the threshold
is 170, player i should choose A when observing Qi ∈ [182, 258] and Qi ≥ 300 and
choose B when observing Qi < 182 and Qi ∈ [259, 299].
4.2.4 Coordination and Efficiency with Incomplete Information
Under incomplete information, the most efficient symmetric outcome is when all
players use a threshold of 289. The expected payoff for each player if all players
can agree on this threshold is 334.05 per period. However, this threshold is not
an equilibrium. If all other players use this threshold, player i has a best response
7Each of 6 players has 2 choices, A and B with the same probability, so there are 26 possibilities.
The number of possibilities that k players choose A is 6Ck which is the number of different,
unordered combinations of k objects from a set of 6 objects. 6Ck can be calculated from 6!k!(6−k)! .
So, the probability that k players choose A is
6!
k!(6−k)!
26 .
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threshold of 227 in which he earns an expected payoff 343.51 per period.
An expected payoff from playing the unique equilibrium threshold of 182 is 316.85
per period. This is about 95% of the expected payoff from the most efficient thresh-
old. Another interesting threshold is 300, a secure strategy under complete informa-
tion, an expected payoff from playing this threshold is 333.70. This is about 99.9%
of the expected payoff from the most efficient threshold. The best response threshold
given that all other players use a threshold of 300 is 233 with the expected payoff
344.78.
4.3 Experimental Design
The stage game form used in the experiment is given in Table 4.2. The stage
game was played 100 times to give adequate experience for the iterative elimination
of strictly dominated strategies to convergence to equilibrium. The values of Q used
in the experiment were integers in the interval 0 to 400, that is, Q ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 400}.
The sequences of a hundred values ofQ were generated by a computer using a uniform
distribution. As stated in the instructions, “Many sequences of one hundred Qs were
generated. One of these sequences will be used in today’s session.” The sequence
was chosen to be representative of a uniform distribution even in small samples. The
units denote fifteenths of a cent.
Two treatments were conducted. In the baseline treatment of complete infor-
mation about Q, Ei = 0. In the incomplete information treatment, Q was only
observed with error. The private signal error was Ei ∈ {−120,−119, . . . , 119, 120}.
The sequences were generated in the same way as the Q sequences. We used the
same sequence of Q for both treatments.
The instructions were read aloud to insure the game was common information
among the participants. After the instructions the participants filled out a question-
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naire to establish that the participants knew how to calculate their earnings. There
were always mistakes on at least one questionnaire and the section on calculating
earnings was always reread to the participants.
Two sessions of three cohorts and one session of two cohorts for a total of eight co-
horts were conducted for each treatment. Each cohort consisted of seven participants.
Thus, each treatment used 56 participants and the total number of participants was
112. The participants were Texas A&M University undergraduates recruited campus
wide using ORSEE, see Greiner (2004).
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree, see
Fischbacher (2007). The experiment was conducted in the Economic Research Lab-
oratory at Texas A&M University in April 2014. A five dollar show up fee plus their
earnings in the session were paid to the participants in private and in cash. The
average earning is about $26.14 for a session that lasted about 90 minutes.
After the decision making portion of the session was completed and while they
waited for their earnings to be calculated, participants filled out a questionnaire that
asked them to explain their behavior in the session.
4.4 Experimental Results
Subjects in my experiments played a sequence of 100 global entry games.8 Section
4.3.1 reports basic results and Section 4.3.2 estimate the threshold using logit model.
4.4.1 Basic Results
A useful way to look at the data is with the frequency of A among a cohort by
either the private signal, Qi, or Q depending on whether the treatment is incomplete
information or complete information. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 report the frequency for the
complete information treatment for the first and the last 50 periods, respectively.
8100 games used in my experiments are shown in the appendix.
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Tables 4.5 and 4.6 report the frequency for the incomplete information treatment for
the first and the last 50 periods, respectively.
Cohorts 1 to 8 on Tables 4.3 and 4.4 were conducted under the complete infor-
mation conditions. Looking at the tables, it is clear that subjects used threshold
strategies: they selected A when Q were high and B when Q were low. There were
some choices that are dominated strategies, i.e., they selected A when Q < 100 or
selected B when Q > 300. The proportion of people who chose dominated strategies
are small and those who chose B when Q > 300 could be interpreted as other-
regarding preferences since that would help other group members earned higher for
that period. 9 In the last 50 periods, 80% of choices were A when Q ∈ [250, 300)
and less than half of choices were A when Q ∈ [200, 250) except cohort 1 who chose
A more often than other cohorts.
Cohorts 9 to 16 on Tables 4.5 and 4.6 were conducted under the incomplete in-
formation conditions. Under incomplete information, there exists a unique threshold
of 182. Similar to subjects under complete information treatment, it is clear that
subjects used threshold strategies: they selected A when Qi were high and B when
Qi were low. There were some learning from the first 50 periods to the last 50 peri-
ods. When Qi were less than 150, very few choices were A, especially in the last 50
periods. When Qi ∈ [200, 250), a little more than a half of choices were A; therefore,
it is very clear that they had threshold strategies between 200 and 250.
4.4.2 Estimated Thresholds
The distributions in Tables 4.3 to 4.6 appear to us to have the shape of a logistic
function. In order to get a more precise measure of the heterogeneity of the various
cohorts, I estimated the following logit model on the cohort data for periods 76 to
9There was one person who reported he made choice to avoid coins, and tried to earn exactly
$25; however, he ended up getting $25.10 since I rounded the cents up to the nearest 10-cent.
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Table 4.7: Estimated Logit Models and Critical Values by Cohort for Last 25 Periods
Cohort Treatment b0 b1 Qi = p
−1(0.5) Rank
1 Complete -7.208 0.035 205.1 1
2 Complete -13.523 0.058 231.8 11
3 Complete -7.146 0.030 238.9 14
4 Complete -12.277 0.053 230.9 10
5 Complete -9.558 0.039 246.1 16
6 Complete -15.842 0.067 235.6 13
7 Complete -16.831 0.070 242.1 15
8 Complete -5.688 0.024 234.4 12
9 Incomplete -9.335 0.044 213.8 6
10 Incomplete -6.659 0.031 211.9 4
11 Incomplete -7.357 0.033 225.8 9
12 Incomplete -5.513 0.026 212.8 5
13 Incomplete -6.794 0.032 213.9 7
14 Incomplete -10.752 0.049 220.7 8
15 Incomplete -6.802 0.033 205.7 2
16 Incomplete -6.935 0.033 211.8 3
100:
p(Qi) =
eb0+b1(Qi)
1 + eb0+b1(Qi)
,
where p(Q+E) is the probability of A. Table 4.7 reports the estimated parameters
and the threshold for the sixteen cohorts.
While it is notable that cohort 1 has the lowest estimated threshold among all
cohorts, it is the only cohort under complete information that has a low thresh-
old. All other cohorts under complete information have higher thresholds than all
cohorts under incomplete information. The Mann-Whitney test statistic indicates
that two groups are significatly different (p-value = 0.02). Cohorts 2 to 8 under
complete information have similar thresholds between 230 and 246 and all cohorts
under incomplete information have similar threshold between 206 and 226.
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4.5 Literature Review
Most of the experimental literature testing global games predictions focuses on
variations of the speculative attack model of Morris and Shin (1998) or an entry
game. The first test of global games predictions in the entry game was Heinemann,
Nagel and Ockenfels (2004). In this game, an individual has two choices: ’attack’ and
’not attack’. A player who attacks has an opportunity cost T . If a sufficient number
of players choose to attack, they succeed and each of the attacking agents earns an
amount Y . They assume that the number of players needed for a successful attack
is a nonincreasing function in Y . In this game, if Y < T , the dominant strategy is
’not attack’. There exists Y¯ such that for Y > Y¯ , the dominant strategy is ’attack’.
For Y such that T < Y < Y¯ , there are two pure Nash Equilibria, all ’attack’ and all
’not attack’. The value of Y varied from period to period. Undominated threshold
strategies were used by 92 percent of their subjects. In private information sessions,
estimated mean thresholds were close to the unique equilibrium with low assurance
conditions and below the unique equilibrium with high assurance conditions. In com-
mon information sessions, estimated mean thresholds were between the thresholds
of the payoff-dominant equilibrium and the global game solution. However, assum-
ing subjects believe that other players choose to attack with a probability of 2
3
for
any state fit the data better. Estimated mean thresholds followed the comparative
statics of the global game solution and were higher under private information than
under common information. This implies that common information reduces the at-
tack threshold and increases the prior probability of devaluation in the speculative
attack game.
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Kneeland (2012) classifies a restricted sample of subjects from Heinemann, Nagel
and Ockenfels (2004) into level-k types10 and an equilibrium type. She estimates
that around 70% of subjects are level-k types and 30% are equilibrium types. She
suggests that, “Under limited depth of reasoning, public information coordinates the
beliefs of players with different depths of reasoning, increasing coordination.”
Cornand (2006) has two more treatments in the speculative attack game as in
Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2004). In both treatments, subjects can observe
two signals. In one treatment, subjects observe both private and common signals
whereas subjects in another treatment observe two common signals. She finds that
in the treatment with both private and common information, subjects use the public
signal as a focal point. This implies that one clear public signal can control private
information beliefs from private information.
Kawagoe and Ui (2010) consider a global game with ambiguous variance of noise
terms. They show in their experiment that low quality information (high variance)
makes less players choose the safe action, whereas uncertainty of information quantity
(ambiguous variance) makes more players choose the safe action. They suggest that
providing a more precise variance of noise terms can decrease the probability of a
credit crisis.
Duffy and Ochs (2012) model a speculative attack as a dynamic global game where
subjects have multiple periods to decide whether to attack or not. They find little
difference between static and dynamic games and suggest that assuming a speculative
attack game as a static game is reasonable. In contrast, Brindisi, Celen and Hyndman
(2014) observe a significant difference between static and dynamic global games in
their two-person investment games. They show that endogeneous timing for making a
decision in global games sufficiently improves welfare. In their experiment, a player
10She assumes 3 level-k types: L1,L2 and L3.
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with optimistic beliefs about the profitability of investment invests earlier, which
leads to an investment by others who would not invest otherwise. They argue,
“the behavioral difference between static and dynamic global investments games is
sufficiently different to justify a continued focus on behavior in dynamic games”.
Shurchkov (2013) focuses on learning in a dynamic speculative attack global game.
She finds that subjects act more aggressively than the theoretical predictions when
faced with a high cost of attacking. In addition, the results show a high degree of
learning where subjects adjust their beliefs about other subjects’ behavior between
the stages of the experiment.
In these papers, behavior follows the comparative static prediction of global
games, but not the exact thresholds that the theory would dictate. Subjects of-
ten coordinate on thresholds different from the global games prediction in favor of
payoff dominance in which they can earn more. Allowing subjects to be able to ob-
serve other subjects’ behavior, as in dynamic global games, can reduce strategic risk
of miscoordination, and can move thresholds toward payoff dominance threholds. In
addition, the differences in behavior under common and private information are not
significant which suggests low level of learning to use iterated dominance arguments
in private information conditions.
4.6 Conclusion
It has been shown that in global entry games with strategic complements, subjects
deviate from an equilibrium prediction in favor of payoff dominance. However, in
many situations strategic substitutes may result when there is as a congestion effect.
This paper considers global entry games with strategic substitutes and complements.
With strategic substitutes, payoff dominance does not exist and deviating from an
equilibrium prediction does not generate higher payoffs to players.
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Each subject participates in either complete or incomplete information treat-
ments. Under complete information, subjects play different strategies as expected.
Under incomplete information, subjects use thresholds above the theoretical predic-
tions. The results are different from subjects in previous research who use thresholds
below the theoretical predictions. The main difference from previous literature is the
absence of the payoff dominance. Without payoff dominance, subjects do not enter
the market (choose a risky option) too often.
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5. SUMMARY
Carlsson and van Damme (1993a) introduce a global game as a tool for equilib-
rium selection in games with multiple equilibria. The theory of global games converts
a complete information game with multiple strict equilibria into an incomplete infor-
mation game, where players only observe a noisy signal of a common state variable.
This results in many cases in a unique dominance solvable equilibrium prediction.
My dissertation theoretically and experimentally examines global games in three
different games: stag hunt, bargaining and entry games. In all of these games, there
are multiple equilibria in games with complete information conditions; however, there
is a unique equilibrium in games with incomplete information conditions.
In stag hunt games, subjects under incomplete information play similar strate-
gies to those under complete information. Under complete information, subjects
coordinate on the payoff maximizing equilibrium, as expected. Under incomplete in-
formation, subjects exhibit substantial deviations from the equilibrium prediction of
global games, coordinating just as well as subjects in the complete information treat-
ment. I argue that gains from deviating from an equilibrium can drive experimental
cohorts away from the equilibrium toward an efficient alternative.
Subjects in the two other games play strategies that are closer to the global games
theory when compared with subjects in the stag hunt games. In the bargaining
games, around two-thirds of the subjects can be classified as the risk dominance (or
global games) type using a finite-mixture model. Global games theory can predict
better than alternative principles including Utilitarian and Rawlsian principles in
bargaining games.
The results from global entry games with strategic substitutes and complements
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are substantially different from the results from global entry games with only strategic
complements in previous literature. Subjects in my experiments enter the market
less often than theoretical predictions, while subjects in previous studies enter the
market more often than theoretical predictions. The results indicate that in the
absence of payoff dominance, subjects do not select risky options too often.
In summary, global games theory can be a useful tool in selecting an equilibrium
from a game with multiple equilibria under complete information. Although experi-
mental subjects do not strictly follow the prediction of the global games theory, they
follow its comparative static predictions. One alternative that could drive exper-
imental subjects away from the prediction is payoff dominance, in which subjects
could earn more from deviating from an equilibrium. Without payoff dominance,
subjects plays closer to the prediction of the theory.
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APPENDIX A
GLOBAL STAG HUNT GAMES
A.1 100 Games Used in Chapter 2
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Table A.1: Incomplete Information Treatment: Q and Qi: Periods 1 to 25
Period (Q,Q1, Q2, . . . , Q8)
1 (275, 260, 269, 311, 265, 230, 296, 257, 266)
2 (113, 104, 91, 108, 122, 132, 154, 67, 155)
3 (496, 537, 462, 538, 494, 513, 504, 516, 501)
4 (403, 453, 403, 388, 386, 382, 358, 410, 420)
5 (66, 67, 29, 112, 70, 38, 92, 60, 110)
6 (548, 593, 585, 540, 571, 523, 517, 587, 543)
7 (323, 346, 337, 280, 274, 340, 281, 277, 362)
8 (121, 144, 161, 145, 153, 140, 135, 171, 151)
9 (577, 570, 539, 587, 534, 563, 577, 543, 586)
10 (363, 331, 379, 383, 365, 315, 357, 372, 368)
11 (15, -22, 60, 64, -7, 32, 60, 33, 28)
12 (315, 327, 334, 356, 288, 283, 299, 357, 294)
13 (432, 424, 396, 459, 470, 413, 413, 411, 412)
14 (482, 449, 456, 492, 472, 518, 479, 506, 480)
15 (125, 83, 141, 136, 108, 141, 84, 111, 124)
16 (37, 19, -6, 87, 17, 38, -10, 3, 76)
17 (486, 523, 528, 469, 521, 468, 482, 517, 505)
18 (165, 136, 173, 158, 127, 186, 169, 212, 152)
19 (19, 58, 25, -31, 4, 5, 42, 45, 33)
20 (335, 362, 331, 315, 361, 354, 359, 297, 354)
21 (243, 283, 203, 287, 229, 201, 281, 216, 195)
22 (475, 474, 458, 474, 428, 515, 503, 466, 429)
23 (247, 204, 217, 216, 270, 234, 261, 266, 218)
24 (220, 176, 247, 200, 255, 251, 242, 253, 201)
25 (429, 391, 420, 472, 407, 412, 423, 405, 423)
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Table A.2: Incomplete Information Treatment: Q and Qi: Periods 26 to 50
Period (Q,Q1, Q2, . . . , Q8))
26 (110, 111, 107, 72, 102, 160, 60, 103, 67)
27 (329, 351, 355, 296, 350, 293, 368, 281, 289)
28 (290, 272, 335, 296, 332, 293, 299, 254, 328)
29 (502, 490, 466, 482, 485, 548, 540, 473, 523)
30 (15, -25, 37, 38, 57, 59, -30, 53, 43)
31 (106, 106, 131, 107, 131, 132, 70, 102, 86)
32 (402, 413, 402, 360, 423, 361, 402, 362, 381)
33 (55, 89, 85, 5, 95, 43, 7, 61, 30)
34 (596, 616, 602, 582, 613, 566, 582, 594, 563)
35 (4, -9, 4, -42, -5, 16, 14, 27, 28)
36 (484, 502, 470, 437, 450, 453, 485, 510, 473)
37 (56, 42, 9, 25, 57, 95, 84, 45, 43)
38 (282, 277, 328, 268, 290, 332, 240, 316, 318)
39 (230, 204, 261, 203, 252, 229, 217, 183, 274)
40 (426, 434, 439, 454, 422, 459, 440, 394, 467)
41 (39, 63, 16, 1, -9, 10, 7, 78, 11)
42 (253, 277, 227, 225, 263, 280, 242, 236, 206)
43 (74, 66, 108, 106, 117, 94, 87, 78, 63)
44 (325, 282, 348, 322, 307, 278, 375, 345, 350)
45 (117, 158, 74, 138, 141, 160, 112, 79, 123)
46 (399, 414, 360, 365, 390, 388, 362, 426, 449)
47 (308, 344, 280, 354, 310, 303, 349, 304, 352)
48 (255, 236, 290, 212, 228, 207, 245, 234, 272)
49 (571, 558, 612, 553, 575, 521, 603, 613, 587)
50 (174, 136, 139, 138, 213, 142, 186, 202, 144)
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Table A.3: Incomplete Information Treatment: Q and Qi: Periods 51 to 75
Period (Q,Q1, Q2, . . . , Q8)
51 (329, 379, 303, 374, 314, 304, 328, 305, 317)
52 (236, 208, 236, 277, 255, 215, 235, 239, 240)
53 (544, 511, 524, 555, 555, 575, 519, 494, 502)
54 (92, 140, 54, 100, 123, 51, 65, 53, 60)
55 (463, 426, 465, 508, 504, 448, 456, 504, 462)
56 (259, 209, 291, 277, 242, 213, 271, 234, 250)
57 (397, 404, 418, 415, 362, 438, 404, 440, 347)
58 (497, 500, 451, 452, 472, 494, 503, 472, 453)
59 (455, 458, 480, 420, 438, 497, 448, 414, 488)
60 (119, 111, 75, 156, 117, 96, 82, 123, 107)
61 (576, 543, 619, 547, 601, 566, 597, 569, 549)
62 (477, 503, 503, 519, 479, 491, 481, 527, 478)
63 (46, 67, 85, 69, 88, 32, 87, 50, 22)
64 (169, 149, 152, 196, 124, 146, 166, 206, 219)
65 (204, 161, 176, 170, 173, 209, 231, 246, 162)
66 (225, 262, 241, 187, 242, 249, 175, 177, 232)
67 (513, 549, 552, 477, 546, 517, 557, 552, 483)
68 (5, 31, -1, 11, -42, 43, 2, 39, -34)
69 (420, 385, 414, 386, 385, 419, 416, 412, 397)
70 (47, 42, 75, 41, 34, 17, 30, 82, 57)
71 (307, 274, 292, 324, 356, 320, 310, 326, 324)
72 (551, 572, 519, 591, 559, 504, 534, 583, 594)
73 (576, 543, 589, 587, 526, 614, 538, 578, 580)
74 (158, 123, 172, 190, 195, 132, 172, 135, 117)
75 (87, 92, 90, 48, 129, 118, 119, 73, 48)
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Table A.4: Incomplete Information Treatment: Q and Qi: Periods 76 to 100
Period (Q,Q1, Q2, . . . , Q8))
76 (412, 437, 455, 422, 412, 417, 380, 409, 375)
77 (433, 408, 383, 412, 464, 460, 468, 483, 404)
78 (180, 160, 168, 199, 155, 152, 148, 180, 130)
79 (591, 567, 626, 557, 594, 568, 603, 638, 609)
80 (370, 345, 344, 378, 408, 371, 354, 367, 375)
81 (600, 594, 642, 628, 609, 583, 622, 566, 571)
82 (192, 189, 189, 215, 185, 242, 240, 184, 222)
83 (337, 371, 324, 292, 356, 318, 371, 370, 364)
84 (116, 121, 101, 98, 163, 79, 139, 148, 68)
85 (361, 404, 358, 338, 342, 334, 398, 363, 401)
86 (342, 322, 351, 387, 308, 380, 388, 351, 390)
87 (550, 573, 510, 501, 510, 569, 576, 521, 511)
88 (51, 70, 76, 24, 55, 14, 24, 66, 73)
89 (582, 602, 595, 604, 586, 616, 540, 563, 585)
90 (309, 342, 288, 344, 276, 291, 324, 273, 296)
91 (508, 480, 533, 540, 495, 536, 506, 504, 523)
92 (157, 161, 192, 129, 199, 131, 185, 191, 171)
93 (367, 412, 375, 334, 358, 364, 412, 375, 378)
94 (201, 158, 201, 154, 233, 216, 228, 178, 199)
95 (143, 121, 112, 161, 121, 115, 132, 109, 141)
96 (224, 243, 196, 250, 260, 272, 176, 265, 258)
97 (502, 550, 464, 494, 529, 487, 472, 540, 549)
98 (211, 236, 209, 186, 189, 252, 259, 210, 229)
99 (287, 322, 321, 272, 243, 241, 265, 268, 333)
100 (319, 281, 294, 349, 275, 321, 272, 294, 290)
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Table A.5: Complete Information Treatment: Q: Periods 1 to 50
Period Q Period Q
1 433 26 192
2 255 27 596
3 329 28 165
4 600 29 180
5 224 30 402
6 577 31 370
7 174 32 397
8 484 33 259
9 46 34 113
10 19 35 230
11 287 36 117
12 66 37 403
13 121 38 551
14 106 39 236
15 582 40 247
16 591 41 497
17 550 42 275
18 169 43 367
19 315 44 432
20 39 45 204
21 158 46 329
22 225 47 477
23 576 48 496
24 290 49 92
25 426 50 342
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Table A.6: Complete Information Treatment: Q: Periods 51 to 100
Period Q Period Q
51 37 76 319
52 110 77 15
53 420 78 363
54 87 79 116
55 143 80 548
56 325 81 399
57 220 82 571
58 4 83 15
59 119 84 337
60 544 85 51
61 308 86 508
62 5 87 429
63 125 88 74
64 513 89 307
65 243 90 502
66 455 91 576
67 282 92 482
68 335 93 47
69 253 94 486
70 309 95 502
71 412 96 55
72 361 97 323
73 157 98 475
74 56 99 211
75 201 100 463
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Table A.7: Chapter 2 Instructions-Complete Information
A B
A 500,500 100, Q
B Q, 100 Q,Q
A.2 Instructions
A.2.1 Complete Information Treatment
Instructions
This session consists of one hundred separate decision making periods. You will
participate in a group of eight people. At the beginning of period one, each of the
participants in this room will be randomly assigned to a group of size eight and will
remain in the same group for the entire one hundred decision making periods of the
experiment. Hence, you will remain grouped with the same seven other participants
for the next one hundred periods.
At the beginning of each period, you and all other participants will choose an
action. An earnings table (on the next page) is provided which tells you the earnings
you receive given the action you and all other participants chose. The actions you
may choose are row A or row B. During a period everyone will have the same earnings
table.
Your earnings are located in each cell. Units are twentieths of a cent. Your choice
will be matched with the choices of the other participants in your group. You will
receive the average of these earnings. The following table lists your choices A and B
in the rows, and other participants in your group’s choices in the columns.
Table
You have 2 choices, A and B, for all 100 periods. If you chose A and 5 other
participants chose A and 2 chose B, then you would earn (500*5 + 100*2)/7 = 385.71
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points or 19.29 cents. If you chose A and 2 other participants chose A and 5 chose
B, then you would earn (500*2 + 100*5)/7 = 214.29 points or 10.71 cents. You will
always receive Q points or Q/20 cents if you chose B.
What is Q?
When you choose B, your earning is Q. Q is an integer between 0 and 600 ran-
domly determined by the computer. That means any number between 0 and 600 is
equally likely to be picked by the computer.
One hundred values of Q have been generated by a computer. Many sequences
of one hundred Qs were generated. One of these sequences will be used in today’s
session. All participants in the session will have the same value of Q in each period.
Making a choice
Making a choice consists of clicking on the button representing the row of your
choice, which changes the numbers (in the table) to green and activates a confirma-
tion button below the earnings table. You may either confirm your choice or change
it by clicking on the button representing the other row. Your choice is not final until
you have clicked on the confirm button.
After you have made a choice, a ”please wait” message will be displayed and then
the outcome will be reported.
Summary
*** The experiment consists of one hundred separate decision making periods.
*** You have been randomly assigned to a group of size eight and will remain in
the same group for the entire one hundred decision making periods of the experiment.
*** You make a choice by clicking on a button, which changes the numbers to
green. You must also confirm your choice by clicking on the ’confirm’ button.
*** Each period, if you choose A, your choice will be matched with all of the
other choices and your earnings will be the average outcome. If you choose B, you
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will earn Q as explained before.
*** Your balance at the end of the session will be paid to you in private and in
cash.
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Table A.8: Chapter 2 Instructions-Incomplete Information
A B
A 500,500 100, Q
B Q, 100 Q,Q
A.2.2 Incomplete Information Treatment
Instructions
This session consists of one hundred separate decision making periods. You will
participate in a group of eight people. At the beginning of period one, each of the
participants in this room will be randomly assigned to a group of size eight and will
remain in the same group for the entire one hundred decision making periods of the
experiment. Hence, you will remain grouped with the same seven other participants
for the next one hundred periods.
At the beginning of each period, you and all other participants will choose an
action. An earnings table (on the next page) is provided which tells you the earnings
you receive given the action you and all other participants chose. The actions you
may choose are row A or row B. During a period everyone will have a private estimate
of the same earnings table.
Your earnings are located in each cell. Units are twentieths of a cent. Your choice
will be matched with the choices of the other participants in your group. You will
receive the average of these earnings. The following table lists your choices A and B
in the rows, and other participants in your group’s choices in the columns.
Table
You have 2 choices, A and B, for all 100 periods. If you chose A and 5 other
participants chose A and 2 chose B, then you would earn (500*5 + 100*2)/7 = 385.71
points or 19.29 cents. If you chose A and 2 other participants chose A and 5 chose
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B, then you would earn (500*2 + 100*5)/7 = 214.29 points or 10.71 cents. You will
always receive Q points or Q/20 cents if you chose B.
What is Q?
When you choose B, your earning is Q. Q is an integer between 0 and 600 ran-
domly determined by the computer. That means any number between 0 and 600 is
equally likely to be picked by the computer.
One hundred values of Q have been generated by a computer. Many sequences
of one hundred Qs were generated. One of these sequences will be used in today’s
session. All participants in the session will have the same value of Q in each period.
Before you make a decision you will not be told what Q is but instead you will
receive an estimate of Q, which we will denote by E. Let’s be more precise. After
the computer randomly determines Q, it also picks a random integer between Q - 50
and Q + 50. This is your estimate E. Any number between Q - 50 and Q + 50 is
equally likely to be picked by the computer. Although E does not tell you what Q is
exactly, it gives an estimate of it. For example if you receive an estimate E = 406,
then you know that Q is not less than 406 - 50 = 356 and it is not more than 406 +
50 = 456.
Note that although Q will be the same for you and the other participants, your
estimates can be different. That is, for the same Q, the computer also randomly
picks other estimates exactly in the same manner for all other participants. All of
these estimates are chosen independently. Therefore, it is very likely that they will
be different numbers; however, all estimates will be between Q - 50 and Q +50.
Making a choice
Making a choice consists of clicking on the button representing the row of your
choice, which changes the numbers (in the table) to green and activates a confirma-
tion button below the earnings table. You may either confirm your choice or change
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it by clicking on the button representing the other row. Your choice is not final until
you have clicked on the confirm button.
After you have made a choice, a ”please wait” message will be displayed and then
the outcome will be reported.
Summary
*** The experiment consists of one hundred separate decision making periods.
*** You have been randomly assigned to a group of size eight and will remain in
the same group for the entire one hundred decision making periods of the experiment.
*** You make a choice by clicking on a button, which changes the numbers to
green. You must also confirm your choice by clicking on the ’confirm’ button.
*** Each period, if you choose A, your choice will be matched with all of the
other choices and your earnings will be the average outcome. If you choose B, you
will earn Q as explained before.
*** Your balance at the end of the session will be paid to you in private and in
cash.
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APPENDIX B
GLOBAL BARGAINING GAMES
B.1 100 Games Used in Chapter 3
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Table B.1: Values of W,X, Y, Z: Periods 1 to 25
Period W X Y Z
1 416 403 506 122
2 167 581 388 507
3 45 448 349 123
4 403 117 514 2
5 291 483 312 480
6 309 117 571 102
7 568 47 423 242
8 108 293 522 85
9 41 232 344 5
10 283 169 39 423
11 383 466 277 595
12 236 234 496 101
13 186 88 414 6
14 307 494 201 590
15 349 426 447 204
16 457 378 479 362
17 496 463 588 425
18 124 203 125 182
19 320 93 481 67
20 424 36 0 547
21 581 88 214 139
22 181 366 317 356
23 492 180 275 182
24 389 6 112 18
25 560 201 206 328
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Table B.2: Values of W,X, Y, Z: Periods 26 to 50
Period W X Y Z
26 278 383 578 224
27 41 490 128 135
28 386 40 119 235
29 391 451 577 73
30 126 219 9 540
31 195 138 559 49
32 307 331 562 295
33 120 288 213 189
34 314 321 283 445
35 279 180 517 74
36 116 564 143 158
37 158 591 478 178
38 575 268 369 420
39 278 267 366 213
40 403 251 242 590
41 224 525 482 406
42 352 397 26 534
43 299 515 583 136
44 264 163 554 100
45 138 292 40 296
46 78 587 268 387
47 299 426 266 490
48 45 271 236 260
49 25 338 319 251
50 98 472 167 463
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Table B.3: Values of W,X, Y, Z: Periods 51 to 75
Period W X Y Z
51 81 405 565 14
52 7 483 196 61
53 519 390 538 327
54 202 468 389 331
55 107 423 282 262
56 35 246 61 96
57 325 356 570 222
58 270 482 197 564
59 81 481 477 206
60 566 49 547 363
61 506 181 505 498
62 279 345 46 468
63 12 302 56 58
64 81 451 541 35
65 28 588 541 77
66 232 481 246 368
67 1 345 333 141
68 297 288 556 90
69 100 408 345 302
70 294 128 377 73
71 450 20 247 86
72 172 199 478 121
73 503 262 282 425
74 466 139 361 457
75 511 458 66 554
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Table B.4: Values of W,X, Y, Z: Periods 76 to 100
Period W X Y Z
76 290 537 338 430
77 461 142 179 175
78 540 115 317 160
79 531 117 210 448
80 429 426 528 378
81 166 556 291 215
82 147 562 327 432
83 437 289 569 134
84 429 600 504 460
85 185 369 287 337
86 209 292 507 77
87 582 211 333 213
88 537 19 199 515
89 592 103 129 259
90 512 34 97 218
91 435 1 278 221
92 504 83 159 135
93 88 238 165 133
94 387 210 156 506
95 508 263 335 381
96 348 356 63 485
97 439 105 131 369
98 144 326 101 545
99 565 10 259 563
100 249 555 271 408
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Table B.5: Chapter 3 Instructions-Complete Information
A B
A W,X 100, 100
B 100, 100 Y, Z
B.2 Instructions
B.2.1 Complete Information Treatment
Instructions
This session consists of one hundred separate decision making periods. You will
participate in a group of eight people. At the beginning of period one, each of the
participants in this room will be randomly assigned to a group of size eight and will
remain in the same group for the entire one hundred decision making periods of the
experiment. Hence, you will remain grouped with the same seven other participants
for the next one hundred periods.
In each period, you will be randomly matched with one of the other participants
in your group. At the beginning of each period, you and your counterpart will
observe an earnings table (on the next page) which tells you the earnings you and
your counterpart receive given the actions you and your counterpart chose. The
actions you may choose are row A or row B. During a period everyone will have a
private estimate of the same earnings table.
Table
You will have 2 choices, A and B, for all 100 periods. The table lists your choices
in the rows, and your counterpart’s choices in the columns. Your choice will be
matched with your counterpart. Your earnings, in black, are located on the left of
each cell while your counterparts earnings, in blue, are located on the right. Units
are fifteenths of a cent.
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Table B.6: Chapter 3 Instructions-Complete Information-Example
A B
A 360, 240 100, 100
B 100, 100 300, 300
In each period, there are 4 possible outcomes:
1) If you chose A and your counterpart chose A, then you would earn W points
or W/12 cents and your counterpart would earn X points or X/12 cents.
2) If you chose A and your counterpart chose B, then each of you would earn 100
points or 100/12 = 8.33 cents.
3) If you chose B and your counterpart chose A, then each of you would earn 100
points or 100/12 = 8.33 cents.
4) If you chose B and your counterpart chose B, then you would earn Y points
or Y/12 cents and your counterpart would earn Z points or Z/12 cents.
What are W, X, Y, Z?
W, X, Y, and Z are integers between 0 and 600 randomly determined by the
computer. One hundred values for each of W, X, Y, and Z have been generated by a
computer. Many sequences of them were generated. One of these sequences will be
used in today’s session. All participants in the session will have the same selected
sequence for each of W, X, Y, and Z.
Example
For example, suppose you observe the earning table as shown above. There are
4 possible outcomes:
1) If you chose A and your counterpart chose A, then you would earn 360 points
or 30 cents and your counterpart would earn 240 points or 20 cents.
2) If you chose A and your counterpart chose B, then each of you would earn 100
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points or 8.33 cents.
3) If you chose B and your counterpart chose A, then each of you would earn 100
points or 8.33 cents.
4) If you chose B and your counterpart chose B, then you would earn 300 points
or 25 cents and your counterpart would earn 300 points or 25 cents.
Making a choice
Making a choice consists of clicking on the button representing the row of your
choice, which changes the numbers (in the table) to green and activates a confirma-
tion button below the earnings table. You may either confirm your choice or change
it by clicking on the button representing the other row. Your choice is not final until
you have clicked on the confirm button.
After you have made a choice, a ”please wait” message will be displayed and then
the outcome will be reported.
Summary
*** The experiment consists of one hundred separate decision making periods.
*** You have been randomly assigned to a group of size eight and will remain in
the same group for the entire one hundred decision making periods of the experiment.
*** You make a choice by clicking on a button, which changes the numbers to
green. You must also confirm your choice by clicking on the ’confirm’ button.
*** Each period, your choice will be randomly matched with one participants
choice in your group. In each cell of the earnings table, your earnings are shown on
the left and your counterparts earnings are shown on the right.
*** Your balance at the end of the session will be paid to you in private and in
cash.
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Table B.7: Chapter 3 Instructions-InComplete Information
A B
A W,X 100, 100
B 100, 100 Y, Z
B.2.2 Incomplete Information Treatment
Instructions
This session consists of one hundred separate decision making periods. You will
participate in a group of eight people. At the beginning of period one, each of the
participants in this room will be randomly assigned to a group of size eight and will
remain in the same group for the entire one hundred decision making periods of the
experiment. Hence, you will remain grouped with the same seven other participants
for the next one hundred periods.
In each period, you will be randomly matched with one of the other participants
in your group. At the beginning of each period, you and your counterpart will
observe an earnings table (on the next page) which tells you the earnings you and
your counterpart receive given the actions you and your counterpart chose. The
actions you may choose are row A or row B. During a period everyone will have a
private estimate of the same earnings table.
Table
You will have 2 choices, A and B, for all 100 periods. The table lists your choices
in the rows, and your counterpart’s choices in the columns. Your choice will be
matched with your counterpart. Your earnings, in black, are located on the left of
each cell while your counterparts earnings, in blue, are located on the right. Units
are fifteenths of a cent.
In each period, there are 4 possible outcomes:
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1) If you chose A and your counterpart chose A, then you would earn W points
or W/12 cents and your counterpart would earn X points or X/12 cents.
2) If you chose A and your counterpart chose B, then each of you would earn 100
points or 100/12 = 8.33 cents.
3) If you chose B and your counterpart chose A, then each of you would earn 100
points or 100/12 = 8.33 cents.
4) If you chose B and your counterpart chose B, then you would earn Y points
or Y/12 cents and your counterpart would earn Z points or Z/12 cents.
What are W, X, Y, Z?
W, X, Y, and Z are integers between 0 and 600 randomly determined by the
computer. One hundred values for each of W, X, Y, and Z have been generated by a
computer. Many sequences of them were generated. One of these sequences will be
used in today’s session. All participants in the session will have the same selected
sequence for each of W, X, Y, and Z.
Before you make a decision you will not be told what W, X, Y, and Z are but
instead you will receive estimates of them. Let’s be more precise. After the computer
randomly determines W, it also picks a random integer (w) between W - 50 and W
+ 50. This is your w. Any number between W - 50 and W + 50 is equally likely
to be picked by the computer. Although w does not tell you what W is exactly, it
gives an estimate of it. For example if you receive an estimate w = 406, then you
know that W is not less than 406 - 50 = 356 and it is not more than 406 + 50 =
456. Similarly, you will observe x, y, and z as estimates of X, Y, and Z in the same
manner to w in each period. You will also see the range of possible values of W, X,
Y, and Z in the earnings table.
Although W, X, Y, and Z will be the same for you and your counterpart, your
estimates can be different. That is, for the same W (this also true for X, Y, and Z),
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Table B.8: Chapter 3 Instructions-Incomplete Information-Example
A B
A 400, 200 100, 100
B 100, 100 270, 320
A B
A 360, 240 100, 100
B 100, 100 300, 300
the computer also randomly picks other estimates exactly in the same manner for
all other participants. All of these estimates are chosen independently. Therefore,
it is very likely that they will be different numbers; however, all estimates will be
between W - 50 and W + 50.
Example
For example, suppose you observe the earning table as shown above. There are
4 possible outcomes:
1) If you chose A and your counterpart chose A, then you would earn 360 points
or 30 cents and your counterpart would earn 240 points or 20 cents.
2) If you chose A and your counterpart chose B, then each of you would earn 100
points or 8.33 cents.
3) If you chose B and your counterpart chose A, then each of you would earn 100
points or 8.33 cents.
4) If you chose B and your counterpart chose B, then you would earn 300 points
or 25 cents and your counterpart would earn 300 points or 25 cents.
Making a choice
Making a choice consists of clicking on the button representing the row of your
choice, which changes the numbers (in the table) to green and activates a confirma-
tion button below the earnings table. You may either confirm your choice or change
it by clicking on the button representing the other row. Your choice is not final until
you have clicked on the confirm button.
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After you have made a choice, a ”please wait” message will be displayed and then
the outcome will be reported.
Summary
*** The experiment consists of one hundred separate decision making periods.
*** You have been randomly assigned to a group of size eight and will remain in
the same group for the entire one hundred decision making periods of the experiment.
*** You make a choice by clicking on a button, which changes the numbers to
green. You must also confirm your choice by clicking on the ’confirm’ button.
*** Each period, your choice will be randomly matched with one participants
choice in your group. In each cell of the earnings table, your earnings are shown on
the left and your counterparts earnings are shown on the right.
*** Your balance at the end of the session will be paid to you in private and in
cash.
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APPENDIX C
GLOBAL ENTRY GAMES WITH STRATEGIC SUBSTITUTES AND
COMPLEMENTS
C.1 100 Games Used in Chapter 4
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Table C.1: Value of Q: Periods 1 to 50
Period Q Period Q
1 255 26 165
2 172 27 21
3 273 28 84
4 57 29 154
5 239 30 262
6 8 31 30
7 152 32 277
8 316 33 205
9 128 34 171
10 320 35 7
11 132 36 230
12 95 37 299
13 167 38 36
14 240 39 369
15 199 40 208
16 4 41 93
17 398 42 152
18 323 43 45
19 24 44 308
20 321 45 287
21 241 46 200
22 287 47 80
23 58 48 302
24 290 49 92
25 426 50 342
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Table C.2: Value of Q: Periods 51 to 100
Period Q Period Q
51 245 76 180
52 256 77 354
53 117 78 175
54 35 79 231
55 398 80 202
56 185 81 121
57 233 82 26
58 295 83 358
59 326 84 235
60 112 85 306
61 213 86 157
62 139 87 341
63 367 88 287
64 265 89 62
65 373 90 264
66 278 91 99
67 400 92 356
68 126 93 86
69 294 94 209
70 173 95 186
71 347 96 251
72 202 97 171
73 124 98 38
74 192 99 212
75 206 100 177
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Table C.3: Chapter 4 Instructions-Complete Information
No. of choice A 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
A Q Q+ 50 Q+ 100 Q+ 200 Q+ 100 Q+ 50 Q
B 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
C.2 Instructions
Instructions
This session consists of one hundred separate decision making periods. You will
participate in a group of seven people. At the beginning of period one, each of the
participants in this room will be randomly assigned to a group of size seven and will
remain in the same group for the entire one hundred decision making periods of the
experiment. Hence, you will remain grouped with the same six other participants
for the next one hundred periods.
In each period, you and all other participants will choose an action. An earnings
table (on the next page) is provided which tells you the earnings you receive given
the action you and all other participants in your group in that period chose. The
actions you may choose are row A or row B. During a period everyone will have a
private estimate of the same earnings table.
Table
Your earnings are located in each cell. Units are fifteenths of a cent. You have 2
choices, A and B, for all 100 periods. If you chose A and no other participant chose
A, then you would earn Q points. If you chose A and 1 other participant chose A,
then you would earn Q+50 points. If you chose A and 2 other participants chose A,
then you would earn Q+100 points. If you chose A and 3 other participants chose A,
then you would earn Q+200 points. If you chose A and 4 other participants chose A,
then you would earn Q+100 points. If you chose A and 5 other participants chose
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A, then you would earn Q+50 points. If you chose A and 6 other participants chose
A, then you would earn Q points. If you chose B, you will earn 300 points regardless
of what the other six participants in your group chose.
What is Q?
When you choose A, your earning is between Q and Q+200 depending on the
number of other participants in your group who chose A. Q is an integer between 0
and 400 randomly determined by the computer. That means any number between 0
and 400 is equally likely to be picked by the computer.
One hundred values of Q have been generated by a computer. Many sequences
of one hundred Qs were generated. One of these sequences will be used in today’s
session. All participants in the session will have the same value of Q in each period.
Making a choice
Making a choice consists of clicking on the button representing the row of your
choice, which changes the numbers (in the table) to green and activates a confirma-
tion button below the earnings table. You may either confirm your choice or change
it by clicking on the button representing the other row. Your choice is not final until
you have clicked on the confirm button.
After you have made a choice, a ”please wait” message will be displayed and then
the outcome will be reported.
Summary
*** The experiment consists of one hundred separate decision making periods.
*** You have been randomly assigned to a group of size eight and will remain in
the same group for the entire one hundred decision making periods of the experiment.
*** You make a choice by clicking on a button, which changes the numbers to
green. You must also confirm your choice by clicking on the ’confirm’ button.
*** In each period, if you choose A, you will earn between Q and Q+200 de-
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pending on the number of other participants in your group who chose A as explained
before.
*** In each period, if you choose B, you will earn 300 points.
*** Your balance at the end of the session will be paid to you in private and in
cash and the exchange rate is 1,500 experimental points for a dollar.
119
Table C.4: Chapter 4 Instructions-Incomplete Information
No. of choice A 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
A Q Q+ 50 Q+ 100 Q+ 200 Q+ 100 Q+ 50 Q
B 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
C.2.1 Incomplete Information Treatment
Instructions
This session consists of one hundred separate decision making periods. You will
participate in a group of seven people. At the beginning of period one, each of the
participants in this room will be randomly assigned to a group of size seven and will
remain in the same group for the entire one hundred decision making periods of the
experiment. Hence, you will remain grouped with the same six other participants
for the next one hundred periods.
In each period, you and all other participants will choose an action. An earnings
table (on the next page) is provided which tells you the earnings you receive given
the action you and all other participants in your group in that period chose. The
actions you may choose are row A or row B. During a period everyone will have a
private estimate of the same earnings table.
Table
Your earnings are located in each cell. Units are fifteenths of a cent. You have 2
choices, A and B, for all 100 periods. If you chose A and no other participant chose
A, then you would earn Q points. If you chose A and 1 other participant chose A,
then you would earn Q+50 points. If you chose A and 2 other participants chose A,
then you would earn Q+100 points. If you chose A and 3 other participants chose A,
then you would earn Q+200 points. If you chose A and 4 other participants chose A,
then you would earn Q+100 points. If you chose A and 5 other participants chose
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Table C.5: Chapter 4 Instructions-Incomplete Information-Estimated Earnings Table
No. of choice A 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
A E E + 50 E + 100 E + 200 E + 100 E + 50 E
B 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
A, then you would earn Q+50 points. If you chose A and 6 other participants chose
A, then you would earn Q points. If you chose B, you will earn 300 points regardless
of what the other six participants in your group chose.
What is Q?
When you choose A, your earning is between Q and Q+200 depending on the
number of other participants in your group who chose A. Q is an integer between 0
and 400 randomly determined by the computer. That means any number between 0
and 400 is equally likely to be picked by the computer.
One hundred values of Q have been generated by a computer. Many sequences
of one hundred Qs were generated. One of these sequences will be used in today’s
session. All participants in the session will have the same value of Q in each period.
Estimate earnings table
Before you make a decision you will not be told what Q is but instead you will
receive an estimate of Q, which we will denote by E. Let’s be more precise. After the
computer randomly determines Q, it also picks a random integer between Q - 120
and Q + 120. This is your estimate E. Any number between Q - 120 and Q + 120
is equally likely to be picked by the computer. Although E does not tell you what
Q is exactly, it gives an estimate of it. For example if you receive an estimate E =
206, then you know that Q is not less than 206 - 120 = 86 and it is not more than
206 + 120 = 326.
Note that although Q will be the same for you and the other participants, your
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estimates can be different. That is, for the same Q, the computer also randomly
picks other estimates exactly in the same manner for all other participants. All of
these estimates are chosen independently. Therefore, it is very likely that they will
be different numbers; however, all estimates will be between Q - 120 and Q +120.
Making a choice
Making a choice consists of clicking on the button representing the row of your
choice, which changes the numbers (in the table) to green and activates a confirma-
tion button below the earnings table. You may either confirm your choice or change
it by clicking on the button representing the other row. Your choice is not final until
you have clicked on the confirm button.
After you have made a choice, a ”please wait” message will be displayed and then
the outcome will be reported.
Summary
*** The experiment consists of one hundred separate decision making periods.
*** You have been randomly assigned to a group of size eight and will remain in
the same group for the entire one hundred decision making periods of the experiment.
*** You make a choice by clicking on a button, which changes the numbers to
green. You must also confirm your choice by clicking on the ’confirm’ button.
*** In each period, if you choose A, you will earn between Q and Q+200 de-
pending on the number of other participants in your group who chose A as explained
before.
*** In each period, if you choose B, you will earn 300 points.
*** Your balance at the end of the session will be paid to you in private and in
cash and the exchange rate is 1,500 experimental points for a dollar.
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